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KEITH B. HALL*
Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures
Cross Property Lines, is There an
Actionable Subsurface Trespass?
ABSTRACT
The law recognizes trespass liability for subsurface intrusions, at
least in some circumstances. Further, courts sometimes have stated
that ownership of land extends to the earth’s center. But such state-
ments are dicta. Few courts have carefully considered the maximum
extent of subsurface ownership or subsurface trespass liability.
Courts in two jurisdictions have recently addressed whether a person
incurs liability when he causes hydraulic fracturing fluid to intrude
into the subsurface of a neighbor’s land, but the courts reached oppo-
site conclusions, with each suggesting that public policy supported
its position. Neither adequately examined the legal issues. Careful
consideration of trespass concepts demonstrates that a person should
not incur liability for such intrusions unless he designed the frac-
tures to extend beneath the neighbor’s land or the fractures extended
further beneath the neighbor’s subsurface than the maximum typical
discrepancy between planned and actual fracture lengths. This result
serves the public policy concerns addressed by each court that re-
cently considered this issue.
INTRODUCTION
The use of hydraulic fracturing1 raises numerous legal issues.2
One of the most interesting issues relates to property rights and is illus-
* Keith B. Hall is Director of the Mineral Law Institute and the Campanile Charities
Professor of Energy Law at Louisiana State University (LSU), where he teaches Mineral
Rights, Advanced Mineral Law, International Petroleum Transactions, and a seminar that
focuses on environmental issues relating to oil and gas activity. Before joining LSU, he was
a member of Stone Pigman Walther Wittmann LLC in New Orleans, where he represented
clients in oil and gas, environmental, and toxic tort matters. He serves on the Board of
Editors for the Oil and Gas Reporter and as Chair of the Louisiana State Bar Association’s
Environmental Law Section. Before going to law school, he worked as a chemical engineer.
1. Hydraulic fracturing is sometimes called by various other terms, such as “fracing,”
“fracking,” “hydrofracturing,” and “hydrofracking.” Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Fracturing
Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 361, 361 (2012). “Fracking” has become the
shortened term most often used in the media, but “fracing” is more traditional and still is
often used by persons who regularly practice oil and gas law or do other work in the
industry. NORMAN J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION,
DRILLING AND PRODUCTION 423–26 (2d ed. 2001) (petroleum geologist using “fracing”);
Christopher S. Kulander, Environmental Effects of Petroleum Production: 2010-2011 Texas Leg-
islative Developments, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 863, 869 (2012) (oil and gas law professor repeat-
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362 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 54
trated by the following scenario. Suppose that a company’s hydraulic
fracturing operations cause fracturing fluid to travel from the subsurface
of one property into the subsurface of a neighboring property where the
company has no authority to operate. The neighbor complains that the
cross-boundary fracturing has harmed him because it is facilitating the
drainage of oil or gas from the subsurface of his property over to the
company’s well, but otherwise the neighbor does not allege any actual
damages. In those circumstances, does the intrusion of fracturing fluid
into the subsurface of the neighbor’s property constitute an actionable
subsurface trespass?3
Two courts have faced this issue in recent years—the Texas Su-
preme Court4 and the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of West Virginia5—but neither court spent much time analyzing
whether a trespass had occurred. The Texas Supreme Court concluded
that it did not need to decide whether there had been a trespass because
the rule of capture barred the recovery sought by the plaintiffs. But the
rule of capture would not necessarily bar recovery if there had been tres-
pass. In the West Virginia case, the defendant argued that, as a matter of
edly using “fracing”); Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture: An Oil
and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 933–36 (2005) (two oil and gas law professors repeat-
edly using “fracing”). Because of Natural Resources Journal style guidelines, “fracking” and
“hydraulic fracturing” are used in this article, rather than “fracing.”
2. Several of the issues relate to environmental concerns. A discussion of the various
issues raised by hydraulic fracturing is beyond the scope of this article, but there are other
articles that provide a broader review of the range of issues raised by fracturing. See, e.g.,
Keith B. Hall, Recent Developments in Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation and Litigation, J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. (forthcoming); Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Ap-
palachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229 (2010); Christopher S. Kulander, Shale Oil and Gas State
Regulatory Issues and Trends, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1101 (2013); Bruce M. Kramer, Federal
Legislative and Administrative Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, 44 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 837 (2012). There are also articles that focus on specific issues raised by hydraulic
fracturing. Robin Kundis Craig, Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), Federalism, and the Water-
Energy Nexus, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 241 (2013); Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: Trade Secrets
and the Mandatory Disclosure of Fracturing Water Composition, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 399 (2013);
Keith B. Hall, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 19 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2011-2012); Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a
Fracturing Energy Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV. Sidebar 1 (2011).
3. Others have also addressed this issue. See, e.g., David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to
the Oil Patch: Modern Property Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir Problems, 19 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 259–64 (2011); Owen L. Anderson, Lord Coke, the Restatement, and Modern
Subsurface Trespass Law, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 203 (2010-2011); Norman J. Hyne &
Laura H. Burney, Hydraulic Fracturing: Stimulating Your Well or Trespassing Theirs?, 44
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. INST. 19-1 (1998); Terry D. Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing: The
Stealthy Subsurface Trespass, 28 TULSA L.J. 311 (1993).
4. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
5. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2013 WL 2097397 (N.D.W. Va. 2013).
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law, a subsurface intrusion of fracturing fluid in a deep formation would
not constitute a trespass. The court dismissed that argument in a con-
clusory manner, relying on questionable dicta regarding the extent of a
landowner’s subsurface ownership and failing to analyze that dicta.
Thus, the courts reached opposite results, but each court’s analysis was
deficient.
This article analyzes the trespass issue that received short shrift by
both the Texas Supreme Court and the federal district court. Ultimately,
this article concludes that subsurface intrusions of fracturing fluid
should not be classified as an actionable trespass, provided such intru-
sions are “near border” intrusions and that drainage of hydrocarbons is
the only alleged harm. Further, a contrary result that classified such
near-border intrusions as an actionable trespass would promote waste
and impair correlative rights. On the other hand, a traditional trespass
analysis demonstrates that an actionable subsurface trespass would oc-
cur if cross-border fractures go beyond the near-border area. Finally, this
article concludes that while an argument can be made for a “modern”
trespass rule in which such subsurface intrusion would not constitute a
trespass no matter how far the fractures went, such a rule could result in
waste and harm to correlative rights unless a conservation agency
closely regulates the extent of fracturing and the use of statutory pooling.
Part I of this article explains the nature of hydraulic fracturing.
Part II discusses the rule of capture, the doctrine that the Texas Supreme
Court concluded would generally bar claims for subsurface intrusions by
fracturing fluids. Part III examines how the law of trespass has been ap-
plied in trespass cases based on subsurface intrusions, as well as in tres-
pass cases based on airspace intrusions, which raise some of the same
issues as subsurface intrusions. Part IV reviews past hydraulic fracturing
litigation. Part V analyzes how a traditional trespass analysis applies to
subsurface intrusions. Parts VI and VII demonstrate why the viability of
a trespass claim based on subsurface intrusions by fracturing fluid
should depend on whether the intrusion is limited to “near border” ar-
eas. Finally, Part VIII analyzes proposals for a “modern” subsurface tres-
pass model that would eliminate virtually all claims for trespass based
on subsurface intrusions of fracturing fluid.
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I. BASICS OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION AND
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
When natural deposits of oil or gas are found, the deposits typi-
cally are found in the pore spaces of sedimentary rock formations.6 In
contrast to coal and “hard” minerals that generally are found in the solid
state, oil and gas most often exist as fluids—either as a liquid or a gas.7 In
some ways, this makes oil or gas easier to handle than solid minerals.
Whereas solid minerals must be “picked up” and moved, oil or gas will
flow of their own accord from a location at higher pressure to a location
at lower pressure.8 Further, underground formations are often under a
much higher pressure than exists on the surface. Thus, if a well is drilled
to a formation that contains oil or gas, the natural pressure of the forma-
tion often will cause those fluids to flow to the well and up to the
surface.9
To get to the well, the oil or gas must move through the rock for-
mation. Often, the oil or gas can do this by moving from one pore space
to the next, through interconnections between the pores.10 Or, in some
rock formations, natural fractures (cracks) exist and the oil or gas can
move through the fractures to the wellbore.11 But in other rock forma-
tions, the interconnections between pores are not sufficient to allow a
significant rate of fluid flow and there are few natural fractures.12 If such
formations contain oil or gas, it will not be economical to produce those
substances through drilling alone. Instead, the operator of a well must
generate fractures in the formation in order to create a pathway for oil or
gas to move to the well.13
6. RICHARD C. SELLEY, ELEMENTS OF PETROLEUM GEOLOGY 239 (2d ed. 1997); JAMES G.
SPEIGHT, THE CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF PETROLEUM 103 (2d ed. 1991).
7. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW
§ 101 [hereinafter MARTIN & KRAMER]. But oil can exist as a solid or as a liquid that is so
viscous that it appears to be in the solid state.
8. Id. at § 104; Deltic Timber Corp. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1192,
1197 (W.D. Ark. 1998); Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kansas, 489 U.S.
493, 497 (1989).
9. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 7, at § 104. Further, oil can be pumped to the R
surface.
10. WILLIAM L. LEFFLER & MARTIN S. RAYMOND, OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION IN NONTECH-
NICAL LANGUAGE 39 (2006).
11. Christopher Kulander, The States’ Legal Framework: Texas/Louisiana Region American
Law and Jurisprudence on Fracing, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. SPECIAL INST. On Hydraulic
Fracturing Core Issues & Trends, Paper No. 3A (2011) (discussing the Austin Chalk as an
example of a low permeability formation that has extensive natural fracturing).
12. See DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MOD-
ERN WORLD 326 (2011).
13. Id.
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Operators began engaging in fracturing in the 1860s.14 They
would lower an explosive into the well and detonate it, thereby fractur-
ing the formation.15 Such “explosive fracturing,” sometimes called
“shooting a well,” was used until at least the mid-1900s.16 But in the late
1940s, hydraulic fracturing was developed.17 In hydraulic fracturing,
companies use hydraulic pressure to open new fractures and increase the
size of existing fractures, thereby opening pathways for oil or gas to flow
to the well.18 Today, hydraulic fracturing is a process that is frequently
used by companies engaged in the exploration for and production of oil
and natural gas.19
II. THE RULE OF CAPTURE: JUSTIFICATIONS
AND LIMITATIONS
In the United States, the right to explore for and produce minerals
generally belongs to the owner of the land beneath which the minerals
are found.20 Because solid minerals remain stationary until they are re-
14. See HYNE, supra note 1, at 422; see also Roberts v. Dickey, 20 F. Cas. 880, 883–84 R
(W.D. Pa. 1871) (No. 11,899) (discussing a patent granted in 1866 for an invention relating
to explosive fracturing); see also People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59 (Ind. 1892) (nuisance
action in which plaintiffs complained about use of explosive fracturing in urban area).
15. HYNE, supra note 1, at 422; see also GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE FRACKERS: THE OUT- R
RAGEOUS INSIDE STORY OF THE NEW BILLIONAIRE WILDCATTERS, 27–28 (2013).
16. HYNE, supra note 1, at 422. R
17. Thomas E. Kurth et al., American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracing, 47 ROCKY MOUN-
TAIN MIN. L. FOUND. J. 277, 279 (2010).
18. HYNE, supra note 1 at 423. R
19. A Congressional Research Service report states that more than 90 percent of new
wells in the United States are hydraulically fractured. Mary Tiemann & Adam Vann, Hy-
draulic Fracturing and Safe Drinking Water Act Regulatory Issues, Congressional Research Ser-
vice, summary (Jan. 10, 2013).
20. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Tomlinson, 859 P.2d 1088, 1094 (Okla. 1993); California Miner-
als v. Cnty. of Kern, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6.
An exception to the general rule is that, in most states, ownership of mineral rights can be
severed from the ownership of land. This can occur if a landowner sells the mineral rights
or if the landowner sells surface rights and retains mineral rights for himself. Doing either
of these things creates separate estates—a mineral estate and a surface estate. See MARTIN &
KRAMER, supra note 7, at § 301; Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 906 F. Supp. 2d 519, R
522 (N.D. W.Va. 2012). This article will refer to the person who has the rights to explore for
and produce minerals from a certain area of land as being the “landowner.” But in most
states a person who owns land can sell his mineral rights, or sell his land and reserve the
mineral rights for himself, thereby creating a “split estate” in which one person owns the
“surface estate” and another person owns the “mineral estate.”). MARTIN & KRAMER, supra
note 7, at § 202.2. Thus, the person who owns the right to explore for and produce minerals R
from particular land could be the owner of a mineral estate, rather than the landowner.
Louisiana law does not allow the creation of a mineral estate, but it allows the creation of a
mineral servitude, which has many of the same characteristics of a mineral estate. Keith
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moved from the subsurface by human action, it generally should be
fairly simple to determine who has a right to produce the solid minerals
in a particular location; indeed, it should be as simple as determining
who the landowner is. But different issues arise with respect to minerals
such as oil and gas,21 which generally exist in a fluid state, and which are
sometimes called “fugacious” minerals.22
A. The Rule of Capture and its Justifications
When a well is drilled to a subsurface formation that contains oil
or natural gas, those fluids generally will flow to the well from the sur-
rounding area. If the area drained by the well extends beyond the bor-
ders of the tract of land on which the well is located, the well will
produce some oil or gas that is drained from beneath neighboring land.
This can lead to disputes.
For example, suppose that Black, the owner of Blackacre, drills a
well near the border with Whiteacre, a tract owned by his neighbor,
White. Black’s well begins producing oil at a substantial rate, with much
of the oil likely being drained from beneath Whiteacre. Is Black entitled
to operate the well and keep all the proceeds, or is White entitled to
some type of relief—perhaps an injunction to prohibit Black from operat-
ing the well or a judgment requiring Black to share the proceeds with
White?
Courts began facing this issue in the late 1800s. One of the leading
early cases is Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co.23 In Kelly, the plaintiff held a mineral
Hall, Louisiana Oil and Gas Update, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 361, 366–67 (2013). But the
creation of a mineral estate generally establishes a permanent cleavage of surface and min-
eral rights, whereas a mineral servitude will terminate in the event that there is ever a ten-
year period during which the servitude rights are not used. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27.
The general rule in the United States that landowners own the mineral rights relating to
their land is not the global norm. In most other countries, the national government owns
the right to produce minerals. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS IN A NUTSHELL 8 (5th ed. 2009).
21. Test Drilling Service Co. v. Hanor Co., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971–72 (C.D. Ill.
2004) (noting that different issues and rules apply to solid minerals as opposed to minerals
that appear in fluid form); compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:5 (landowner can own solid
minerals in place beneath his property) with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6 (landowner does
not own minerals that are beneath his land in fluid form, and instead merely has the exclu-
sive right to conduct operations to recover such fluids and reduce them to possession);
Callahan v. Martin, 43 P.2d 788, 791–92 (Cal. 1935) (noting that solid mineral rights created
an interest in reality, with an absolute title to the mineral rights, unlike oil and gas mineral
rights, which are in the nature of a profit a prendre—an interest in land similar to an ease-
ment); Tennessee Valley Kaolin Corp. v. Perry, 526 S.W.2d 488, 491 n. 1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1975) (Tennessee law views leases for solid minerals differently than leases for oil and gas).
22. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:5 cmt. (referring to “fugacious” minerals).
23. Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897).
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lease that covered 165 acres in Findlay County, Ohio.24 The defendant
held drilling rights for tracts of land on the east and west borders of the
plaintiff’s leasehold,25 and the defendant owned land on the south bor-
der of plaintiff’s leasehold.26 Beneath the land was a sandstone formation
that contained oil.27
The plaintiff brought suit, complaining that the defendant was
drilling wells near the east, south, and west property lines. The plaintiff
alleged that a well drilled to the sandstone would drain an area with a
radius of about 250 feet around the well, and that the defendant had
begun drilling a series of wells only 25 feet from the border of Hastings’
land, so that the defendant’s wells would drain a significant amount of
oil from beneath Hasting’s property. The plaintiff sought a permanent
injunction to bar the defendant from operating wells any closer than 250
feet from Hastings’ land. The lower court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim,
concluding that he failed to state a cause of action.
The plaintiff appealed, but the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of his claim. The court emphasized property rights as a basis of
its decision. The court stated that “[t]he right to drill and produce oil on
one’s own land is absolute, and cannot be supervised or controlled by a
court or an adjoining landowner.”28 The court found it “intolerable that
the owner of real property, before making improvements on his own
lands, should be compelled to submit to what his neighbor or a court of
equity might regard as a reasonable use of his property.” The court also
noted that it is impossible to know what fraction of the produced oil
came from beneath each tract. Therefore, “whatever gets into the well
belongs to the owner of the well, no matter where it came from.” Finally,
the court stated that “an ample and sufficient remedy” is for the neighbor
to drill his own wells, and that he is not entitled to either an injunctive
relief or an accounting.
Another early case was Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co.29 In
Barnard, the defendant leased a tract of land. A corner of the tract pro-
truded into the plaintiffs’ tract of land. The defendant drilled a well near
the corner and began producing natural gas.30 The plaintiffs brought suit,
complaining that much of the natural gas was being drained from be-
neath their property. The court concluded that the typical gas well in
that area would drain a 10-acre circle that surrounded the well. Further,
24. Id. at 399.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 401.
29. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1907).
30. Id. at 801.
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if a 10-acre circle were drawn around the defendant’s well, slightly more
than three-fourths of the area within the circle would be the plaintiffs’
land. Thus, a plausible estimate was that 75-percent of the gas produced
from the defendant’s well came from beneath the plaintiffs’ land.
The lower court dismissed the plaintiff’s case, however, basing its
decision in part on the right of a landowner to drill a well wherever he
chooses on his property.31 The court also noted that “[t]here is no certain
way of ascertaining how much of the oil and gas that comes out of the
well” was originally beneath the property on which a well is located and
how much was beneath the neighboring property.32 Accordingly, ex-
plained the court, if a landowner believes that his property is being
drained, his only remedy is to drill his own well.33 Instead of seeking to
stop his neighbor’s drilling, he should “go and do likewise.”34 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court’s per curiam decision affirmed and quoted in
full the lower court’s decision.35 This result became known as the “rule of
capture,” or sometimes the “law of capture,”36 and appears to have been
adopted by all states that have addressed the issue in the oil and gas
context.37
B. Limitations on the Rule of Capture
There are certain situations in which the rule of capture does not
apply. Three of the most significant situations in which the rule does not
apply are when: (1) a person commits a subsurface trespass by engaging
in slant drilling that results in the well bottoming beneath his neighbor’s
property; (2) a person negligently or intentionally wastes oil or gas or he
intentionally interferes with the ability of someone else to produce oil or
gas from a formation, without benefit to himself; or (3) the rule has been
superseded by conservation statutes and regulations.38
31. Id. at 802.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 803.
36. TERENCE DAINTITH, FINDERS KEEPERS? HOW THE LAW OF CAPTURE SHAPED THE
WORLD OIL INDUSTRY (2010); Kramer &.Anderson, supra note 1, 933–36. R
37. See, e.g., Gadeco, LLC v. Indus. Comm’n of State, 812 N.W.2d 405, 407 (N.D. 2012);
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 12–13 (Tex. 2008); Bonner v.
Oklahoma Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 1176, 1185 (Okla. 1993); Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 277
So.2d 218, 220 (La. Ct. App. 1973). Other sources provide excellent, more comprehensive
treatment of the rule of capture. See, e.g., Kramer & Anderson, supra note 1; DAINTITH, supra R
note 36. R
38. These situations are described below. A fourth situation in which the rule of cap-
ture does not apply, though the situation is not at issue here, is the circumstance in which a
company places natural gas into subsurface storage and that gas escapes and is later pro-
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The two latter types of limitation have been justified by the doc-
trine of “correlative rights.” This doctrine recognizes that when multiple
tracts of land overlie a common reservoir of oil or gas, the owners of
those separate tracts each have a right to produce oil or gas from the
reservoir through operations on their own properties, but that each
owner’s exercise of his rights can affect the common reservoir and
thereby affect the ability of the other owners’ to produce oil or gas from
the reservoir.39 Accordingly, each owner has certain duties that relate to
the reservoir, and the other owners have rights that arise from that
duty.40
1. Surface Trespass and Subsurface Trespass by Slant Drilling
A landowner generally has the exclusive right to explore for and
produce minerals from operations on his own land.41 Further, the rule of
capture provides that the landowner becomes the owner of all the oil and
gas produced from operations on his own land, and that he incurs no
liability to his neighbor, even if some of the oil or gas that is drained
from beneath the neighbor’s land.42 Thus, the rule of capture does not
authorize a person to enter the surface of another person’s land to con-
duct oil and gas operations.43 If a landowner conducts operations on his
neighbor’s property without permission, those operations generally will
constitute a trespass, and the trespasser typically will be required to re-
duced from a well operated by a neighbor. N. Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Servs. Co.,
296 P.3d 1106 (Kan. 2013).
39. Eugene Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 MISS. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1958); Halbouty
v. R.R. Comm’n, 357 S.W.2d 364, 374 (Tex. 1962) (“It is an obvious result that if in a com-
mon reservoir one tract owner is allowed to produce many times more gas than underlies
his tract he is denying to some other landowner in the reservoir a fair chance to produce
the gas underlying his land.”).
40. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562–63 (Tex. 1948); Higgins Oil & Fuel
Co. v. Guar. Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 212 (La. 1919) (“The rights of the several owners of the gas
field are coequal; one owner cannot exercise his own right so as to preclude his neighbor
from exercising his, or so as to interfere with the neighbor.”). Professor David Pierce has
argued that the question of whether a subsurface intrusion of fracturing fluids constitutes
an actionable trespass should be resolved using a correlative rights analysis. David E.
Pierce, Minimizing the Impact of Oil and Gas Development by Maximizing Production Conserva-
tion, 85 N.D. L. REV. 759, 771 (2009).
41. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6 (1975).
42. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:8, 14.
43. Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897) (early rule of capture case stat-
ing: “To drill an oil well near the line of one’s land cannot interfere with the legal rights of
the owner of the adjoining lands so long as all operations are confined to the lands upon
which the well is drilled.”).
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imburse the neighbor for the value of the oil or gas produced.44 Depend-
ing on circumstances and the jurisdiction, the trespasser may or may not
be able to deduct his drilling expenses from the reimbursement
amount.45
A similar result follows for a subsurface intrusion by “slant” drill-
ing. Slant drilling occurs when the wellbore of a “vertical” well does not
go straight downward. Sometimes an operator deliberately engages in
slant drilling, which might be called “directional” drilling when it is
done intentionally, and sometimes the operator’s direction of drilling
will deviate from true vertical inadvertently.46 Courts have recognized
that the operator of a well commits a subsurface trespass if he begins
drilling a well at a surface location where he has the right to operate, but
the wellbore veers from true vertical to such an extent that the wellbore
intrudes into the subsurface of a neighboring property where the opera-
tor has no right to drill.47 In such cases, the measure of damages may be
the value of the oil or gas produced by the trespassing wellbore.48
44. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 488. When a company trespasses and drills with-
out authority to operate at the surface location, the company generally does not knowingly
trespass. See JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 144 (6th ed.
2013). Instead, the operator generally has operated pursuant to a lease obtained from a
person without good title or has operated pursuant to an otherwise valid lease that has
terminated. It is not always clear whether a lease has terminated because, although mineral
leases generally have a primary term that is a stated number of years, virtually all modern
leases have habendum clauses and other clauses that can lead to a later termination, and
many have delay rental clauses or other provisions that can lead to earlier terminations.
45. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 488.
46. HYNE, supra note 1, at 285. R
47. Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So.2d 471, 474 (La. 1943); Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v.
Bell View Oil Syndicate, 76 P.2d 167, 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938); see also Williams v. Cont’l Oil
Co., 14 F.R.D. 58 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex.
1950).
48. The Manual of Oil & Gas Terms defines “subsurface trespass” as follows:
The bottoming of a well on the land of another without his consent. Sub-
surface trespass results from the drilling of a “slant” or [directional well],
which may be intentional or unintentional. Since subsurface trespass is as
wrongful as surface trespass, the same liability attaches, viz., damages in
the amount of the value of the oil produced. Whether the trespasser is
entitled to a credit for the cost of producing the oil depends on whether
his trespass was made in good faith or bad faith, as it does in the case of
surface trespass.
HOWARD R. WILLIAMS ET AL., MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 946 (13th ed. 2006).
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2. Negligent or Intentional Waste or Deliberate Interference with the
Production Rights of Others
Courts have used the correlative rights doctrine to justify certain
jurisprudential limits on the rule of capture. Two examples of such limits
are found in decisions recognizing that the rule of capture does not pro-
tect a defendant from liability for negligent or intentional waste of oil or
gas in a reservoir,49 and that the rule of capture does not protect a person
from liability for acts that are of no benefit to himself, and which are
done with the intent of interfering with someone else’s ability to exercise
his rights to produce from the common pool.
The non-application of the rule of capture in cases of negligent or
intentional waste of resources is illustrated by Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.50
In that case, the defendants were drilling a gas well that blew out, caught
fire, and burned for several years.51 The land around the well cratered,
and the cratering eventually extended to the plaintiffs’ property, damag-
ing it.52 The plaintiffs brought suit, alleging that the blowout resulted
from the defendants’ negligence.53 The plaintiffs sought a money judg-
ment for the damages to their property and for the natural gas that had
been drained from beneath their property because of the blowout.54
The defendants argued that the rule of capture prevented the
plaintiffs from recovering the value of oil or gas drained from beneath
their property by the defendants’ well. The Texas Supreme Court held
that “under the law of capture there is no liability for reasonable and
legitimate drainage from the common pool.”55 But the court also stated
that drainage which results from the negligent waste of gas is not legiti-
mate drainage, and that the rule of capture should not deny the plaintiffs
a remedy for the losses they sustained because of such waste.56
The non-application of the rule of capture in cases in which a de-
fendant intentionally interferes with another person’s ability to produce
oil or gas from the common reservoir is illustrated by Higgins Oil & Fuel
Co., Inc. v. Guaranty Oil Co.57 In that case, the plaintiff drilled a well and
began producing oil from a reservoir from which other persons in the
area were also producing oil. The defendant was the plaintiff’s neighbor.
The defendant also drilled a well to the reservoir. For some reason, the
49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:14; Kuntz, supra note 39, at 2. R
50. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
51. Id. at 559.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 562.
56. Id. at 563.
57. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co., Inc. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233 (1919).
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defendant’s well was not productive, but his well seemed to be physi-
cally linked to the common reservoir. Indeed, the plaintiff alleged that
the opening to the surface provided by the defendant’s well was dimin-
ishing the rate of production from the plaintiff’s well. Though the defen-
dant’s well was not productive, the defendant refused to close or plug it,
instead preferring to leave it open with the intent and purpose of de-
creasing the plaintiff’s ability to produce oil.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendant must plug
his well. The court suggested that the defendant would not have been
obligated to take affirmative action to benefit the plaintiff if the plaintiff’s
inability to produce oil was merely the result of “inaction” by the defen-
dant. However, here the defendant had created the opening that was
interfering with the plaintiff’s ability to produce oil from the common
reservoir. Further, the court suggested that the defendant would not be
obligated to plug his well if he obtained some benefit from leaving it
open, but the defendant could not leave the well open merely for the
purpose of diminishing the plaintiff’s ability to produce oil.
3. Conservation Statutes and Regulations
In addition to serving as a justification for the above-noted judi-
cial limitations on the rule of capture, the correlative rights doctrine also
is one of the justifications for legislative and regulatory measures58 that
limit the rule of capture in an effort to address certain problems that it
can cause.
There are three notable problems that can arise from the rule of
capture. First, because the rule gives a landowner an incentive to pro-
duce oil or gas as quickly as possible, in order to produce those sub-
stances before his neighbor does, the rule can prompt persons to drill
more wells than are necessary to efficiently drain the oil or gas in an
area.59 Because drilling wells is expensive, excess drilling is a form of
economic waste. Second, because it is impossible to recover 100 percent
of the oil in a reservoir, some oil always is left in place underground, but
too rapid a rate of production can lead to lower overall recovery and a
greater amount of oil left underground than if the individuals in an area
were operating at a more moderate pace.60 The lower recovery is a form
58. Conservation statutes and regulations include such provisions as well-spacing
rules, restrictions on venting and flaring, limitations on allowable production rates, prora-
tioning, and forced pooling.
59. Gadeco, LLC v. Indus. Comm’n of State, 812 N.W.2d 405, 407 (N.D. 2012); Nunez
v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So.2d 955, 960 (La. 1986) (rule of capture encouraged indis-
criminate drilling).
60. Nunez, 488 So.2d at 960 (referring to possible waste of reservoir energy and dimin-
ished ultimate recovery).
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of physical waste. Third, some persons might conclude that it is unfair to
divide the proceeds of production in an area based simply on who pro-
duces the oil or gas first.61
Starting in the early 1900s, states began to address these problems
with conservation statutes and regulations.62 Three of the most common
methods are well spacing rules, setback rules, and forced pooling or uni-
tization. Well spacing rules require that the distance between wells be at
least a minimum distance that is set by statute or regulation. Setback
rules require that wells generally be located no closer than a specified
distance from property lines. “Forced pooling” or “unitization” gives reg-
ulators the authority to enter an order that designates a specified area as
a “unit.”63 Typically, the size of a unit will be the maximum area that can
be efficiently drained by one well. Generally, regulators will allow only
one well to be drilled within the unit,64 and specify that all persons own-
ing mineral rights within the unit will share in the proceeds from that
well.
Such conservation rules were challenged as being unconstitu-
tional taking of a person’s property rights without compensation.65 And
indeed conservation rules do restrict a person’s exercise of his property
rights. For example, if he owns land in a forced pool or unit, but some
other person has received a permit to drill the single well that will be
allowed within the unit, the first individual may be barred from drilling
on his property. Or, if a person has drilled a unit well, but he owns only
some of the property in the unit, he will be forced to share the proceeds
of his well’s production with the other persons who own property in the
unit. But courts upheld such conservation rules against constitutional
challenges.66 In rejecting the constitutional challenges, the courts relied in
61. Cf. id. (noting that one goal of conservation regulation can be “to [e]nsure a fair
and reasonable participation, by the surface owners in the common pool within the pro-
ducing area”).
62. Id. (discussing Louisiana conservation statutes enacted in early 1900s).
63. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:9-10. “Pooling” and “unitization” often are used
interchangeably, though some people use the two words to describe analogous, but distin-
guishable, types of conservation orders. This article will use the two words
interchangeably.
64. A particular unit generally applies only for a specific formation. See, e.g., EOG Re-
sources, Inc. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 605 F.3d 260, 262–63 (5th Cir. 2010) (referring to
units that applied to particular formations beneath the same area of land). Thus, if there are
multiple productive formations in an area, each at different depths, there may be multiple
units that cover the same area, though each will apply as to different depths beneath the
surface.
65. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Hunter Co. Inc. v. McHugh, 11
So.2d 495 (La. 1943); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83 (Okla. 1938).
66. See Ohio Oil Co., 177 U.S. 190; Hunter Co. Inc., 11 So.2d 495; Patterson, 77 P.2d 83.
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part on the correlative rights doctrine. The courts noted that each person
who owns rights in a common pool of oil or gas has a right to produce
from the common pool, but each person’s exercise of his right will affect
the ability of other persons to exercise their rights.67 This, along with the
general police power, justifies conservation regulations that are designed
to avoid both physical and economic waste and protect each person’s
right to produce his fair share of oil or gas from the common reservoir.68
III. TRESPASS AND THE AD COELUM DOCTRINE
The extent to which a person has a claim for an alleged subsurface
trespass requires consideration of the nature of trespass claims, as well as
the ad coelum doctrine, which concerns a landowner’s rights relating to
the airspace above his land and the subsurface below it.
A. Trespass
A trespass is an intrusion onto land in violation of a plaintiff’s
exclusive right of possession.69 A plaintiff must have the right of posses-
sion in order to bring a claim in trespass.70 Typically, a landowner has
the right to possess his own land and therefore he will have the right to
bring a trespass action if someone intrudes without permission.71 If the
owner does not possess the land, but no one else has established posses-
67. See Ohio Oil Co., 177 U.S. 190; Hunter Co. Inc., 11 So.2d 495; Patterson, 77 P.2d 83.
68. See Ohio Oil Co., 177 U.S. 190; Hunter Co. Inc., 11 So.2d 495; Patterson, 77 P.2d 83.
The concept also serves as a basis for a claim that a rule or regulatory order that prevented
a landowner from developing his resources altogether is a taking of private property.
Kuntz, supra note 39 at 7 (citing R.R. Comm’n v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 169 S.W.2d 253 R
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943)).
69. Team Enters., LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Trust, 647 F.3d 901, 912 (9th Cir. 2011)
(under California law, a trespass is “an invasion of the interest in the exclusive possession
of land”); Minch Family LLLP v. Buffalo-Red River Watershed Dist., 628 F.3d 960, 968 (8th
Cir. 2010) (Minnesota law); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS at Ch. 3,
§ 13 (p. 77) (5th ed. 1984).
70. Florig v. Estate of O’Hara, 912 A.2d 318, 327 n.13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); see also
KEETON ET AL., supra note 69. R
71. Babb v. Lee County Landfill SC, LLC, 747 S.E.2d 468, 473 (S.C. 2013); Johnson v.
Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 700–701 (Minn. 2012). If the
land is under lease, the lessee might be the person who has the right to bring a trespass
action. Bascom v. Dempsey, 9 N.E. 744, 744–45 (Mass. 1887) (lessor who was not in posses-
sion could not bring trespass action); Ikomoni v. Exec. Asset Mgmt., LLC, 709 S.E.2d 282,
286 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); Sumrall v. City of E. St. Louis, 2013 WL 141694 *2 (S.D. Ill. 2013)
(lessee can bring trespass action). If someone has established wrongful possession, the
landowner may not have a claim in trespass, but if his ownership has not been lost by
adverse possession he may have the right to bring an ejectment action or a petitory action
to force the possessor to leave. KEETON ET AL., supra note 69; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3651. R
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sion, the landowner has constructive possession and therefore could
bring an action in trespass against an intruder.72
Although “trespass” often is described as an intrusion onto land,
the law recognizes that a trespass also can occur by intrusion into the
airspace over land or the subsurface below land.73 This is appropriate for
a number of reasons. First, for surface possession and ownership to have
any utility, a landowner typically must have ownership rights and con-
trol with respect to some distance above and below the surface of the
land. For example, if a landowner is going to build any structure on his
land, the structure will likely project into the airspace above the ground.
Further, a foundation may need to project into the subsurface, and it is
often useful or necessary to have utility lines, basements, and water
wells constructed into the subsurface.
Second, recognizing such intrusions as trespasses is consistent
with the notion that trespass actions are designed to vindicate a person’s
possessory interest. If a person is in actual possession of the surface of
land, he necessarily will be using and occupying at least some minimum
amount of airspace above and subsurface below the surface. For exam-
ple, if a person exercises possession of land by using it and constructing
a house on it, that person is using and occupying the airspace to an ele-
vation at least as tall as the house, and his actual possession probably
should be deemed to include some reasonable distance above the highest
elevation that he is using.
A similar argument can be made with respect to the subsurface.
And even if the owner74 has not built structures that project below the
surface, or any structures whatsoever, he needs some minimum amount
of ground beneath the surface to support his own weight. If someone
tunneled beneath the owner’s subsurface to within an inch of the
ground, the surface would collapse. Thus, a person’s possessory interest
would not be secure and might be vulnerable to undue interference if his
possession was deemed to end immediately above and below the space
he is actually using. Finally, noise or other effects of airspace or subsur-
face intrusions might interfere with the landowner’s use and enjoyment
of his land, even if it did not directly and physically interfere. The princi-
ple that intrusions into the airspace above land or the subsurface below
72. KEETON ET AL., supra note 69. R
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965); Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93
(Iowa 1902) (airspace); Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950)
(subsurface).
74. Although the right to bring a trespass claim is based on possession, not ownership,
this article sometimes will refer to the “owner” or “landowner” as the person who has or
might have a trespass claim.
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land has been recognized in numerous cases, as illustrated by cases dis-
cussed below in Section III(B) of this article.
B. The Ad Coelum Doctrine and its Application in Trespass Cases
Few landowners exercise actual possession of the regions far
above or below the surface. But a landowner might have constructive
possession of such regions, and thus have a remedy against intrusions
into the airspace above or the subsurface below his land, assuming that
he owns those regions.
Further, a literal interpretation of a traditional maxim of the com-
mon law suggests that a landowner does own such regions. Prominent
common law commentators and numerous American courts have ex-
pressed a maxim known as the ad coelum doctrine, which provides that
the owner of land owns not just the surface, but the entire airspace above
it and the entire subsurface below it.75 This doctrine’s name comes from
the Latin phrase “cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos,”
which has been translated as “for whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to
Heaven and down to Hell.”76
On numerous occasions, courts have held that liability for trespass
can be based on airspace or subsurface intrusions. For example, courts
have held that a landowner has an action in trespass when some portion
of a neighboring building or other construction intrudes into his air-
space.77 Such intrusions have included eaves,78 cornices,79 and roofs80 that
project over a plaintiff’s property. Courts have held that wires passing
over a plaintiff’s property can constitute a trespass,81 and one court held
that a defendant committed a trespass when she extended her arm over
the property line.82 Courts also have recognized that a person commits a
trespass when he drills a slant well that bottoms below the plaintiff’s
land.83
75. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817, 825 (Ga. 1934).
76. Alyce Gaines Johnson Special Trust v. El Paso E & P Co., L.P., 773 F.Supp.2d 640,
645 (W.D. La. 2011).
77. See, e.g., Murphy v. Bolger, 15 A. 365 (Vt. 1888).
78. Huber v. Stark, 102 N.W. 12 (Wis. 1905), cf. Aiken v. Benedict, 39 Barb. 400 (N.Y.
Gen. Term 1863) (ejectment action).
79. Harrington v. McCarthy, 48 N.E. 278 (Mass. 1897).
80. Murphy v. Bolger, 15 A. 365 (Vt. 1888).
81. Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. 2002); Butler v. Frontier
Tel. Co., 79 N.E. 716 (N.Y. 1906).
82. Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93 (Iowa 1902).
83. Wiliams v. Cont’l Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 58 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas
Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950); Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 471 (La. 1944); Al-
phonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 76 P.2d 167 (Cal. App. 1938).
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Notably, the airspace intrusions all occurred relatively near the
surface—at elevations that the plaintiff was actually using, at elevations
close to those the plaintiff was using, or at elevations that the plaintiff
reasonably could be expected to use. And the subsurface intrusions by
slant drilling occurred at depths where the plaintiff reasonably could
have been expected to perform his own oil and gas exploration. What
about intrusions at greater elevations or far beneath the surface? This
raises the question of whether a landowner’s ownership really does ex-
tend all the way to the center of the earth and all the way to the heavens
(with “heavens” presumably meaning outer space).
C. Limitations on the Ad Coelum Doctrine
If the ad coelum doctrine were applied literally, a landowner might
have a viable trespass claim for intrusions at high altitudes, far above
those he was using or reasonably could be expected to use in connection
with his land. He might also have claims for trespass in the event of a
subsurface intrusion, even if the intrusion occurred at a depth he was not
using and could not reasonably be expected to use.
But a clear modern trend in both legal commentary and court de-
cisions is that the ad coelum doctrine does not apply literally and that
landowners’ right to bring trespass claims for high-elevation airspace in-
trusions or deep subsurface intrusions is limited. The cases demonstrate
that a landowner’s rights are limited to the portions of airspace and sub-
surface that are relatively near the surface of the land, and that he does
not have a trespass claim absent intrusions into those areas. Even then
that the landowner might not have a claim for airspace or subsurface
intrusions absent actual harm or substantial interference with the land-
owner’s reasonably foreseeable use and enjoyment of either the land it-
self or the airspace or the subsurface above and below it.
1. Air Travel Limitations to the Ad Coelum Doctrine
It is well-established that a landowner has no cause of action in
trespass against persons who engage in high-altitude air travel over his
property. In Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, the plaintiff brought a claim for
trespass based on aircraft flying over his land.84 At that time, Georgia’s
Civil Code declared that “the right of the owner of lands extends down-
ward and upward indefinitely.”85 Further, the Code stated that “the
owner of realty having title downwards and upwards indefinitely, an
unlawful interference with his rights, below or above the surface, alike
84. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817, 825 (Ga. 1934).
85. Id. (citing Ga. Civ. Code § 3617 (1910)).
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gives him a right of action.”86 The Georgia Supreme noted the impor-
tance of air travel to society,87 but ultimately based its decision on a prop-
erty rights analysis.
The court concluded that the relevant provisions of Georgia’s
Civil Code were based on the common law’s ad coelum doctrine and
therefore should be interpreted as including any limitations existing
within that doctrine.88 The court analyzed the doctrine and concluded
that the full, literal expression of the doctrine is mere dicta. The court
explained that, “[t]he common-law cases from which the ad coelum doc-
trine emanated were limited to facts and conditions close to earth and
did not require an adjudication on the title to the mansions in the sky.”89
Therefore, the pronouncements from such cases were mere dicta with
respect to higher altitudes.90
The Georgia Supreme Court stated that “[p]ossession is the basis
of all ownership” and that title to land therefore “can hardly extend
above an altitude representing the reasonable possibility of man’s occu-
pation and domain.”91 The court reasoned that a landowner could claim
possession to the height of any building, and perhaps the landowner
could be deemed to hold actual possession of the space immediately
above the “trees, buildings, and structures affixed to the soil.”92 Further,
if a neighbor constructed a tall building with an overhang projecting
over the landowner’s property, that construction would demonstrate
that the space was subject to actual possession and therefore the over-
hang might be the basis for a trespass action.93
But flying through the airspace at high altitude is not an act of
possession.94 Therefore, air travel at low altitude across a person’s prop-
erty might constitute a trespass,95 and the operation of aircraft at higher
altitudes that actually interferes with a landowner’s use of the land
86. Id. (citing Ga. Civ. Code § 4477 (1910)).
87. Id. at 819.
88. Id. at 825 (“These provisions of the Code should therefore be construed in the light
of the authoritative content of the maxim itself.”).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 826.
93. Id. at 825.
94. See id. at 825–26.
95. See id. at 826.
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might constitute a nuisance,96 but air travel at higher altitudes would not
constitute a trespass.97
In other cases in which landowners have complained about air-
craft flying over their property, courts similarly have concluded that the
ad coelum doctrine is dicta to the extent that it suggests title to land ex-
tends to indefinite altitudes. Accordingly, landowners may be entitled to
relief if low-altitude flights over their lands cause actual harm or incon-
venience, but they are not entitled to relief for high altitude flyovers that
do not cause harm or inconvenience.98 A particularly notable decision is
the 1946 United States Supreme Court opinion in United States v.
Causby.99
In Causby, a plaintiff who lived near an airfield brought suit, as-
serting that low-level flights had effected a “taking” of his property and
that he was entitled to compensation. The Court ruled that, under the
facts shown, the plaintiff could assert a takings claim because the flights
seriously impaired the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his property,100
which extends upward from the surface to encompass “at least as much
of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection
with the land.”101 But the Court also suggested a landowner would not
have grounds to complain about the mere fact that aircraft fly over his
property at high altitudes. The Court explained that the “[ad coelum] doc-
96. See id. at 825–26 (demonstrating that the landowner “may complain of any [flights]
tending to diminish the free enjoyment of the soil,” though the air travel might be at alti-
tudes above the altitude subject to possession, and it could be a nuisance if the air travel
causes harm or inconvenience).
97. The decision is based on a conclusion that ownership does not extend indefinitely
upward. If a court concluded that ownership extended indefinitely upward, but that con-
structive possession did not, such reasoning might also bar a trespass claim, given that a
landowner would not have actual possession of high elevations and that a person must
have actual or constructive possession in order to bring a trespass claim. But if ownership
extended indefinitely upward, a landowner might be able to bring a claim based on some
other theory, such as ejectment.
98. Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 393–94 (Mass. 1930) (noting alti-
tude of “possible effective possession” as potential limit on trespass claims); see Swetland v.
Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929, 938 (N.D. Ohio 1930) (noting that decisions suggesting
title to land extended to indefinite heights did not involve disputes over alleged trespasses
at altitudes generally used in air travel); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 266 N.Y.S. 469, 471
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1933) (“[I]t may be confidently stated that, if [the ad coelum] maxim ever
meant that the owner of land owned the space above the land to an indefinite height, it is
no longer the law.”).
99. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
100. Id. at 266–67.
101. Id. at 264.
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trine has no place in the modern world,” and the “public interest” re-
quires that the air be a “public highway.”102
The Restatement (Second) of Torts reaches a similar result. Section
159 establishes a general rule that trespasses may occur “above the sur-
face of the earth,” but the Section also states that an aircraft’s flight over
land will not constitute a trespass unless the aircraft “enters into the im-
mediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and . . . it substantially
interferes with the other’s use and enjoyment of his land.”103
2. Injection Disposal Exceptions to the Ad Coelum Doctrine
Many liquid wastes are discarded in injection disposal wells.104
The process is the opposite of what happens in the production of oil
from an oil well or water from a water well. The liquid waste is pumped
down a well that has been drilled to a permeable formation. The waste
exits the well and migrates into the formation. Over time, as more and
more waste liquid is injected into the disposal well, the waste fluid can
migrate across subsurface property lines.
In a handful of cases, plaintiffs have filed lawsuits, alleging that a
neighbor’s operation of an injection disposal well has resulted in a sub-
surface trespass of waste fluids. The trend in such suits is for courts to
hold that a plaintiff cannot maintain a subsurface trespass action merely
102. Id. at 261, 266 (“The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is
part of the public domain.”). The Ohio Supreme Court applied the reasoning that the ad
coelum doctrine does not apply in its full literal expression in support of its holding that a
plaintiff did not have a takings claim based on a zoning law that limited heights of build-
ings near an airport. See also Vill. of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 278 N.E.2d 658, 664
(Ohio 1972) (“It is now well settled that the doctrine of the common law, that the ownership
of land extends to the periphery of the universe, has no place in the modern world.”). Such
reasoning goes further than the decisions that hold that a landowner’s ownership does not
extend beyond the height he can reasonably possess, but is consistent with the proposition
that the ad coelum doctrine is not applied literally.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965). Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
§ 159 (which states that a trespass can occur “above the surface of the earth,”), and RESTATE-
MENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 194 (which provides that air travel over land will not constitute a
trespass if the travel complies with applicable regulation and it has a legitimate purpose, is
conducted in a reasonable manner, and occurs “at such a height as not to interfere unrea-
sonably with the possessor’s enjoyment of the surface of the earth and the air space above
it.”).
104. See Basic Information About Injection Wells, EPA.GOV, http://water.epa.gov/type/
groundwater/uic/basicinformation.cfm#what_is (last updated May 4, 2012). Section C of
the Safe Drinking Water Act governs underground injections. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(c) (2006).
More than 650,000 injection wells have been granted permits to operate under the Safe
Drinking Water Act. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency UIC Inventory by State–2011, http://
water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/upload/uicinventorybystate2011.pdf (last updated
Nov. 19, 2013).
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based on the migration of waste fluids into the subsurface of his prop-
erty. Instead, a plaintiff must be able to show actual damages or an inter-
ference with some reasonably anticipated use of his property in order to
sustain a trespass action.105
For example, in Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., the plaintiffs brought
a class action, asserting trespass claims that were based on allegations
that fluids from the defendant’s injection disposal well had intruded into
the subsurface of the plaintiffs’ properties.106 After a jury returned a ver-
dict finding that the plaintiffs had not proven actual damages or an un-
reasonable interference with a foreseeable use of their properties, the
trial court entered judgment for the defendant.107 The appellate court af-
firmed and the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to review the case.
The plaintiffs argued that proof of a subsurface intrusion is suffi-
cient to prove a trespass and that once a trespass is proven damages
could be presumed.108 The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed. The court de-
clared that the ad coelum doctrine “has no place in the modern world.”109
The court then quoted with approval a case in which the Ninth Circuit
stated that a person’s ownership of the airspace above his land extends
only so far as the space he can use and occupy.110 The Ohio Supreme
Court concluded that similar reasoning should be extended to subsur-
face rights.111 Therefore, in order for litigants to recover in trespass for
the sort of subsurface intrusion alleged by the plaintiffs, they must prove
“physical damage or actual interference with the reasonable and foresee-
able use of the properties.”112 Because the plaintiffs had not proven dam-
ages or interference with use, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment against them.113
105. See, e.g., W. Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass’n v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965, 969–70
(Okla. 1950).
106. Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 986 (Ohio 1996).
107. Id. at 989.
108. Id. at 993.
109. Id. at 991 (citing Winston v. Cornish, 5 Ohio 477, 478 (1832)).
110. Id. at 991–92.
111. Id. at 992. The court also observed that “ownership rights in today’s world are not
so clear-cut as they were before the advent of airplanes and injection wells.”
112. Id. at 993.
113. Id. at 994. See also Baker v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-227, 2009 WL 3698419,
at * 4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2009). In a Kansas case, the plaintiffs complained about an escape
of natural gas from a storage facility. Smith v. Kansas Gas Serv. Co., 169 P.3d 1052, 1054
(Kan. 2007). The plaintiffs proceeded on negligence and nuisance claims only, after volun-
tarily dismissing their trespass claims, so trespass claims were not at issue, but the Kansas
Supreme Court referred to the Ohio Supreme Court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s trespass
theory in Chance v. BP and stated that in Kansas the result likely would be the same—a
plaintiff could not recover for subsurface trespass without showing damages or unreasona-
ble interference with a foreseeable use of his property. Id. at 1054, 1055, 1061. In a dispute
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In Boudreaux v. Jefferson Island Storage & Hub, the plaintiffs brought
suit under Louisiana law, asserting a trespass claim based on the allega-
tion that the salt water from the defendant’s injection disposal well had
intruded into the subsurface of their property.114 The United States Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs had not established an actionable tres-
pass.115 The court reasoned that Louisiana law would not allow recovery
for subsurface intrusion unless the plaintiff could show actual damages
or “measurable inconvenience.”116 Because the plaintiffs had not proven
either of those things, they had failed to establish an actionable tres-
pass.117 The mere existence of a physical intrusion was not sufficient.
A respected torts hornbook espouses a similar view. The horn-
book criticizes a 1929 Kentucky decision in which the court, “notwith-
standing a forceful dissenting opinion,” allowed a surface owner to
recover in trespass on the grounds that the defendant had entered the
subsurface of plaintiff’s land via a case at a depth of 360 feet below the
surface.118 Noting that the plaintiff had no practical access to the case and
no prospect for access, the hornbook characterizes the decision as “very
bad” and as being “dog-in-the-manger law.”119 The hornbook states that
relief should not be allowed in such cases unless there is some damage to
the surface or some interference with a plaintiff’s use of the property.120
Turning to subsurface intrusions caused by injection disposal and gas
storage, the hornbook notes that “[p]erhaps there should be no liability
for subsurface invasions of water, gas, or other substances” unless the
over subsurface water flows, the Colorado Supreme Court suggested that it found the rea-
soning of the Ohio Supreme Court to be persuasive, though the Colorado court’s decision
appears to have been based in large part on Colorado water law. Board of Cnty. Comm’rs
v. Park Cnty. Sportsmen’s Ranch, LLP, 45 P.3d 693 (Colo. 2002).
114. Boudreaux v. Jefferson Island Storage & Hub, LLC, 255 F.3d 271, 272 (5th Cir.
2001).
115. Id. at 274. The court seemed to put some weight on the fact that the defendant had
received a permit from the Louisiana Department of Conservation to operate the injection
disposal well, but that generally should not be a basis for distinguishing the typical cross-
border fracturing case because in most or all states the operator of the well will have been
required to secure a permit in order to drill the well. Prior to Boudreaux, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana rejected claims in two similar cases
based on the same reasoning. Mongrue v. Monsanto, 1999 WL 970354 (E.D. La. 1991), aff’d,
249 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2001); Raymond v. Union Texas Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270
(E.D. La. 1988).
116. Boudreaux, 255 F.3d at 275.
117. Id.
118. KEETON ET AL., supra note 69 at Ch. 3, § 13 (p. 82). R
119. Id. The “dog-in-the-manger” reference is derived from the Aesop’s Fable in which
a dog refuses to let an ox eat hay from a feed trough even though the dog itself cannot eat
hay.
120. Id.
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plaintiff can prove actual damages, an interference with his use of the
property, or, when oil and gas rights are involved, the “unjustifiabl[e]
appropriat[ion]” of products.121
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that a trespass can
occur below the surface,122 but this does not necessarily mean that the
Restatement would impose liability for intrusions by injections resulting
from injection disposal. Liability for trespass is based on entering land
“in the possession of the other.”123 The Restatement provides that to be in
possession of land, a person must be in “occupancy” of it.124 The com-
ments explain that “occupancy” means “such acts done upon the land as
manifest a claim of exclusive control of the land,” and as an example, the
comments note that a person’s construction of an enclosure around land
generally will qualify as occupancy of the entire area enclosed.125 In the
typical case in which a landowner complains about injection disposal,
the defendant can likely make a strong argument that the complaining
landowner does not have possession of the land at the depths where the
injection disposal is being done.
3. Conservation Regulation Exceptions to the Ad Coelum Doctrine
Although a company generally has no right to conduct operations
on or beneath land unless it owns or leases the land, courts sometimes
have found that statutory pooling or unitization of the type described in
section II(B)(3) of this article can create an exception to this rule. Thus, in
the same way that unitization can provide exceptions to the rule of cap-
ture, unitization can modify rules relating to trespass. In Nunez v. Wai-
noco Oil & Gas Co.,126 the Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation
entered orders creating a compulsory unit and issued a permit authoriz-
ing an operator to drill a well that became the unit well. The drilling
began on leased property, near an unleased tract that was part of the
unit. After the well was completed, a directional survey indicated that
the drilling had deviated from vertical and that the well had bottomed
121. Id. at 83. In section VI(A), this article explains why, at least in certain circum-
stances, drainage of oil and gas that is facilitated by cross-boundary fracturing should not
be considered an “unjustifiable appropriation.”
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 159. See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 159
(containing a similar provision).
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158. See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 162
(stating that trespass liability is owed only to persons in possession of land).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 157. See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 157
(containing a similar definition of “possession”).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 157 cmt. a. See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 157 cmt. a (containing a similar definition of “occupancy”).
126. Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So.2d 955, 956–58 (La. 1986).
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about four or five feet inside the subsurface of the unleased tract. The
owner of that neighboring tract brought a trespass action against the op-
erator and other defendants who owned mineral interests in the unit,
seeking an order that required the operator to remove the wellbore.
The district court dismissed the action, concluding that it was an
improper collateral attack on an order of the Commissioner of Conserva-
tion. The appellate court reversed, and remanded the case so that the
district court could determine whether a trespass occurred. The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court granted review and dismissed the case, but on differ-
ent grounds than the district court had done so.
The Supreme Court stated that compulsory unitization converts
the separate exploration and development rights held by different per-
sons within the drilling unit into a common interest for the drilling and
development of the unit.127 The court described the common interest as
“a departure from the traditional notions of private property.”128 The
court then explained that this departure is justified as a “reasonable exer-
cise of the police power” because oil and gas “migrate to points of lower
pressure caused by . . . drilling,” so that one person’s production of oil or
gas affects “the correlative rights” of others who have exploration and
development rights that apply to the “common reservoir.”129 Indeed, uni-
tization “protect[s] private property [by] preventing it from being taken
by one of the common owners without regard to the enjoyment of the
others.”130 The court noted that this had “supercede[d] in part” Louisi-
ana’s rule that the surface owner also owns the subsurface, and that the
trespass alleged by the plaintiff was a subsurface trespass, not a surface
trespass. The court then concluded: “Since established private property
law concepts, such as trespass, have been superceded in part by Louisi-
ana’s Conservation Law when a unit has been created by order of the
Commissioner, we do not find that a legally actionable trespass has oc-
curred in this instance.”131
In a subsequent dispute between Nunez and Wainoco, the Louisi-
ana Third Circuit applied the same principle in concluding that unitiza-
tion orders and the grant of a drilling permit for a particular location can
also alter the rules relating to surface trespass. In that subsequent dis-
pute, Nunez complained that Wainoco used a portion of his land while
drilling a well just on the other side of the property line. Using a portion
of Nunez’s surface during the drilling process had been necessary be-
127. Id. at 961–62.
128. Id. at 962.
129. Id. at 962–63.
130. Id. at 963 (quoting Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 210 (1900)).
131. Id. at 964.
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cause, although the well site was not on Nunez’s property, the site desig-
nated on the drilling permit was near the property line. The appellate
court stated that an operator might be required to compensate the non-
consenting landowner for any damages to his property, but the mere use
of his land is not a basis for trespass liability if use of the land is neces-
sary in order to drill a unit well at the location specified by the Commis-
sioner of Conservation.
Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the opera-
tor of a pooled unit even has the right to drill a unit well at a surface
location owned by a landowner who refuses to give his consent,132
though the owner might be entitled to compensation for the value of
such use under the Takings Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution.133 Fur-
ther, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that, when the state’s
regulators have created a compulsory unit, an operator does not incur
liability for trespass by drilling a horizontal well beneath the property of
an unleased owner without that owner’s consent.134
4. The Rule of Capture, Ownership-in-place, and Non-ownership
Sometimes, a plaintiff complains that a portion of the oil and gas
being produced from a neighbor’s well is being drained from beneath
the plaintiff’s land. All states that have addressed such disputes have
applied the rule of capture, holding that a person obtains ownership of
all oil or gas he produces from a well on his property, even if some of the
oil or gas he produces is drained from adjacent land, and that he does
not incur liability to the neighboring landowners because of such pro-
duction.135 Sometimes it has been suggested that the rule of capture itself
is a limitation on the ad coelum doctrine because, at least in certain cir-
cumstances, it protects a person from liability for conducting operations
that result in drainage of oil or gas from adjoining properties.
Some address this issue by adhering to a “non-ownership” con-
ception of a landowner’s rights with respect to oil and gas located “in
place” beneath his property. The jurisprudence of those states hold that a
landowner generally has the exclusive right to conduct operations on his
property for the purposes of exploring for and producing minerals, but
132. Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Rein, 534 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Okla. 1975).
133. Cormack v. Wil-Mc Corp., 661 P.2d 525, 526–27 (Okla. 1983) (citing Okla. Const.
art. II, § 23).
134. See Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 559 N.W.2d 841, 844 (N.D. 1997). The cases
discussed in this section of the article do not figure prominently in the eventual “model”
that this article suggests is the appropriate synthesis of existing subsurface trespass rules,
but these cases support the conclusion that that are numerous exceptions to a literal appli-
cation of the ad coelum doctrine.
135. DAINTITH, supra note 36 at 7. R
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that he does not own the oil and gas in place beneath his land.136 Thus, if
a neighbor who is operating on adjoining property drains oil or gas from
beneath the landowner’s property, the neighbor has not taken or inter-
fered with the landowner’s property or ownership rights. Under such a
legal theory, the rule of capture is not inconsistent with the ad coelum
doctrine, though someone might argue that a state’s decision to adhere
to a non-ownership theory is in itself a compromise or limitation on the
ad coelum doctrine.
On the other hand, there are some states that follow the rule of
capture, but nevertheless operate under a theory that a landowner owns
the oil and gas in place beneath his property.137 The states reconcile their
ownership-in-place theory with the rule of capture by holding that a
landowner’s ownership of oil and gas is lost once those substances mi-
grate from beneath his land and that he generally has no cause of action
against a neighbor whose oil or gas well has caused such drainage.138
This reconciliation could be viewed as simply a limitation on the nature
of ownership of oil and gas in place, but it also could be viewed as a
limitation on a strict application of the ad coelum doctrine.139
136. See Arrowhead Energy, Inc. v. Baron Exploration Co., 930 P.2d 181, 182 n.1 (Okla.
1996); Bonner v. Oklahoma Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 1176, 1185 (Okla. 1993); Gliptis v. Fifteen
Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 471, 474 (La. 1944); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:7. In such states, a person
acquires ownership of the oil or gas when he reduces them to possession. See, e.g., LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 31:6–7. Those same states sometimes hold that a landowner does own the
solid minerals in place beneath his land. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:5.
137. See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tex. 1948).
138. Id. at 563; see also Halbouty v. R.R. Comm’n, 357 S.W.2d 364, 375 (Tex. 1962) (refer-
ring to “harmoniz[ing]” the rule of capture and ownership-in-place concepts). Because all
states hold that a landowner generally has the exclusive right to use his property for explo-
ration and production, and all apply the rule of capture with respect to drainage, it makes
little difference in most circumstances whether a state is a non-ownership state or an own-
ership-in-place state. However, the difference in theory can make a difference in some con-
texts. For example, arguably it might make a difference in the measure of damages when a
landowner asserts a damages claim against his lessee for breach of the implied covenant to
protect against drainage or whether certain mineral rights can be lost by abandonment. See,
e.g., Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture: An Oil and Gas Perspective,
35 ENVTL. L. 899, 949 (2005); Gerhard v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 692, 703–708 (Cal. 1968).
139. Some have criticized the ownership-in-place doctrine as being a legal fiction, sug-
gesting that a more accurate description of the landowner’s rights is presented by the states
that follow a non-ownership theory. See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the
Earth, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 979, 1009–1010 (2008) (describing ownership-in-place theory as
being “purely rhetorical” and stating that it is “not ownership at all”); see also DAINTITH,
supra note 36 at 31–32 (describing ownership-in-place theory “inconsistent” with the rule of R
capture followed throughout the United States and referring to the “problem of how you
could have full ownership—or indeed, any meaningful ownership at all—of a thing that
someone could take from you with impunity”). If ownership-in-place is a legal fiction, that
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5. Disputes Involving Secondary Recovery and Similar Production
Methods
Disputes regarding secondary recovery present interesting issues
regarding the rule of capture, correlative rights, and trespass. “Primary
recovery” refers to the initial stages of production of oil from a reservoir.
Because a large portion of oil remains in the ground after primary recov-
ery, companies sometimes engage in secondary recovery in order to re-
cover additional oil. One type of secondary recovery is waterflooding. In
waterflooding, several injection wells are used for pumping water into
the reservoir that contains oil in order to push or flush toward a recovery
well a portion of the oil that remains in the ground after primary
recovery.140
Secondary recovery can significantly increase total recovery and is
highly favored as a matter of public policy.141 But while total recovery is
increased, the pumping of water into the reservoir can cause some wells
that are still producing oil to “water out.” Thus, disputes can arise if one
or more parties are conducting secondary recovery operations that ad-
versely impact another person’s well and that person either is not receiv-
ing a share of the production from the secondary recovery operation or
believes his share does not adequately compensate for the watering out
of his well.
In Railroad Commission v. Manziel, plaintiffs challenged an order of
the Texas Railroad Commission that authorized certain secondary recov-
ery operations that the plaintiffs alleged would cause a subsurface tres-
pass that would water out one of their wells.142 The Texas Supreme Court
held that the plaintiffs had no trespass claim. The court noted that secon-
dary recovery is highly favored, that the disputed operation had been
approved by regulators, and that regulators have authority to enter or-
ders to maximize production, minimize waste, and protect correlative
rights.143 The court upheld the order,144 and concluded that “a trespass
does not occur” if a secondary recovery operation that has been ap-
proved by the Railroad Commission pushes fluids across subsurface
property lines.145
undercuts an argument that the rule of capture is an exception to the ad coelum doctrine, as
noted above in the discussion of the non-ownership theory.
140. R.R. Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. 1962) (describing waterflood-
ing operation).
141. Id. at 568.
142. Id. at 561–62.
143. Id. at 568–69.
144. Id. at 574.
145. Id. at 568–69; see also Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442, 450 (Kan. 2002). Such a rule is
consistent with what one prominent authority called “negative rule of capture,” which
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But some other courts have been reluctant to insulate secondary
recovery operations from liability for trespass, particularly if the plaintiff
was not included in the unit and therefore did not share in the proceeds
from the secondary recovery operation.146 Also notable are a series of
bromine production cases from Arkansas. Bromine is an element that is
used for a variety of purposes, including the manufacture of flame
retardants.147 It is found in salt water—both in seawater and in many
subsurface brines.148 A high concentration of bromine, meaning about
3,000 to 5,000 parts per million, is found in brines located about 8,500 feet
below the surface in certain areas of Arkansas.149
Often bromine-rich brine is recovered in an operation that is very
similar to waterflooding.150 Bromine-rich “virgin brine” is produced from
production wells, much of the bromine is recovered, and then “spent
brine” that has a lower concentration of bromine is pumped down injec-
tion wells that push more virgin brine toward the production wells.151
This results in a greater flow of virgin brine to the production wells than
would result if operators merely pumped brine from the production
wells.152
In a handful of cases, courts in Arkansas have heard disputes re-
lating to such “secondary recovery” of brine. In Budd v. Ethyl Corporation,
the defendants held mineral leases on a block of land about 16,000
acres.153 They operated a brine production operation that utilized a num-
ber of injection wells on the periphery of the block and a number of pro-
duction wells in the interior of the block.154 A plaintiff brought suit,
asserting a right to a share of proceeds from the defendants’ brine pro-
duction, based on his interests in two separate tracts of land, which the
court stated “must be discussed separately.”155
The first was a 240-acre tract in which the plaintiff held an undi-
vided one thirty-sixth interest in the minerals.156 The tract was located
would provide that an operator would not incur liability for the injection of substances,
even if such injection “results in the displacement under [the land of others] of more valua-
ble with less valuable substances.” MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 7, at § 204.5. R
146. See, e.g., MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 7, at § 204.5 (discussing several cases). R
147. Albemarle Corp. v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 2007 WL 4589515 *3 (M.D. La. 2007).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Deltic Timber Corp. v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 2 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1194 (W.D.
Ark. 1998).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 474 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Ark. 1972).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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adjacent to, but outside of, the defendants’ lease block.157 The plaintiff
argued that, even though the tract was outside the defendants’ ring of
injection wells, the defendants’ operations were draining brine from be-
neath the 240-acre tract.158 The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the
claim, holding that the rule of trespass barred the claim.159 Thus, the
court established that the rule of capture generally will apply to the pro-
duction of brine under Arkansas law. The second tract was a 40-acre
tract located inside the defendants’ ring of injection wells.160 The court
did not have to decide whether the rule of capture would apply in the
“secondary recovery” context because it rejected the plaintiff’s claim re-
lating to the second tract on other grounds.161
That issue was litigated several years later in Jameson v. Ethyl Cor-
poration.162 The plaintiff owned land inside the ring of injection wells op-
erated for the secondary recovery of brine.163 The operator of the wells
previously had attempted to obtain a lease from the plaintiff on terms
similar to those in the operator’s other leases in the area, but the parties
could not reach an agreement.164 The operator filed suit, seeking a declar-
atory judgment that its operations were protected by the rule of capture.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that “the rule of capture
should not be extended insofar as operations relate to lands lying within
the peripheral area affected” by secondary recovery operations.165 The
court concluded that applying the rule of capture in the context of secon-
dary recovery would give extraction companies too much bargaining
power in their dealings with landowners.166
But the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s
actions should not be classified as a trespass.167 The court found that sec-
ondary recovery operations are important to society as a means of maxi-
mizing recovery of brine, and that brine which is otherwise recoverable
would be “wasted if a single landowner is able to thwart secondary re-
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 412–13.
160. Id. at 413.
161. Id. at 413–14.
162. Jameson v. Ethyl Corp., 609 S.W.2d 346 (Ark. 1980).
163. Id. at 349.
164. Id. at 347–48.
165. Id. at 351.
166. Id.
167. Id. In a prior decision, the United States Eighth Circuit had faced the same question
and had made an Erie-guess that the Arkansas Supreme Court would conclude that subsur-
face intrusions caused by secondary recovery operations did constitute a trespass. See
Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 1975).
35502-nm
n_54-2 Sheet No. 91 Side B      11/04/2014   15:34:52
35502-nmn_54-2 Sheet No. 91 Side B      11/04/2014   15:34:52
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\54-2\NMN203.txt unknown Seq: 30  4-NOV-14 15:01
390 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 54
covery processes.”168 Accordingly, the court held that secondary recovery
operations “should be permitted, when such operations are carried out
in good faith for the purpose of maximizing recovery from a common
pool,” but that a company conducting such operations would be obli-
gated “to compensate the owner of the depleted lands for the minerals
extracted in excess of natural depletion, if any, at the time of taking and
for any special damages which may have been caused to the depleted
property.”169 In effect, the court jurisprudentially provided authority for
unitization or pooling for secondary recovery.170
Thus, courts have reached different conclusions regarding the
rights of parties in secondary recovery disputes, though there seems to
be a trend against classifying subsurface intrusions caused by secondary
recovery operations as being trespasses.
6. Subsurface Trespass Cases Outside the Mineral Law Context
Although a large portion of subsurface trespass disputes arise in
the context of mineral recovery or injection disposal operations, such dis-
putes can arise in other contexts. For example, in Boehringer v. Montalto,
the plaintiff sold property to the defendant on credit, taking a mortgage
and giving a warranty that the property was free from encumbrances.171
The plaintiff later brought an action to foreclose on the mortgage and the
defendant counterclaimed, alleging that the plaintiff had breached the
warranty because the property was not free from encumbrances.172 Evi-
dence showed that the Bronx Valley Sewer Commission previously had
constructed the sewer beneath the property at a depth of about 150 feet,
168. Id.
169. Id. By “natural depletion,” the court apparently meant the amount of depletion, if
any, that would have occurred if the extraction company had conducted only primary re-
covery operations. See id. at 349 (discussing “normal drainage” that would have occurred in
the absence of the operator’s injection wells). A subsequent federal district court decision
reached the same conclusion regarding what is meant by “natural depletion.” See Deltic
Timber Corp. v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1195 (W.D. Ark. 1998).
170. It is not clear if the court thought in terms of providing for unitization, but the
court stated: “While Arkansas’ unitization laws are not, as previously noted, involved in
this case, we do believe that the underlying rationale for the adoption of such laws, i.e., to
avoid waste and provide for maximizing recovery of mineral resources, may be interpreted
as expressing a public policy of this State which is pertinent to the rule of law of this case.”
Jameson, 609 S.W.2d at 351. The court noted that, subsequent to the start of the litigation,
Arkansas enacted legislation authorizing statutory unitization for the production of brine.
Id. at 350 n.1. Before, Arkansas had not provided a statutory basis for unitization for the
production of brine. Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 474 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Ark. 1971).
171. Boehringer v. Montalto, 254 N.Y.S. 276, 276–77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931).
172. Id.
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after acquiring the right to do so by condemnation.173 The Commission
had not acquired any right to access the sewer via the surface of the
property that the plaintiff had sold to the defendant.174
After briefly taking note of prior disputes regarding ownership of
airspace above the property, the court stated that, “[i]t therefore appears
that the old theory that the title of an owner of real property extends
indefinitely upward and downward is no longer an accepted principle of
law in its entirety.”175 The court concluded that “the title of an owner of
the soil will not be extended to a depth below ground beyond which the
owner may not reasonably make use thereof.”176 The court concluded
that the Bronx Valley sewer was located below the deepest depth that the
defendant “can conceivably make use of the property.”177 Accordingly,
the Bronx Valley sewer and the Commission’s easement did not encum-
ber the defendant’s property.178
D. Summary
Courts recognize trespass claims for airspace and subsurface in-
trusions that occur relatively near the surface of the earth. Further, courts
continue to repeat the ad coelum doctrine, which states that a landowner
owns the subsurface beneath his land all the way to the center of the
earth and the airspace above his property all the way into space. But the
full, literal expression of the ad coelum doctrine is dicta. No court has ever
applied the doctrine in a case in which parties disputed rights anywhere
near the center of the earth or the outer reaches of space. Further, when
the courts have faced disputes regarding high elevation and deep sub-
surface intrusions, they typically have held that a plaintiff cannot recover
in trespass unless the intrusion occurred at an elevation or depth that the
plaintiff reasonably could be expected to use, or the intrusion caused ac-
tual harm or interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his
property. Thus, the literal expression of the ad coelum doctrine is not
well-established law, but instead is merely oft-repeated dicta.179
173. Id. at 277.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 278.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Numerous courts and commentators have reached similar conclusions. KEETON, ET
AL, supra note 69, at Ch. 3, § 13 (p. 79) (describing doctrine as “dictum” and stating that, R
“[n]o one now advocates that it be applied literally . . . .”); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 260–61 (1946) (“The [ad coelum] doctrine has no place in the modern world.”); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. g (1965) (noting that the doctrine “has been repeated in
many cases in which there has been no question of anything more than the immediate
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IV. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING INTRUSION CASES
The two most important hydraulic fracturing trespass cases are
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, which is a 2008 decision
from the Texas Supreme Court, and Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, a
diversity jurisdiction case decided by the United States District Court for
the Northern District of West Virginia. But there are a handful of earlier
cases from Texas that provide interesting background. Those pre-Garza
Texas cases are briefly discussed below, followed by discussions of Garza
and Stone.
A. Pre-Garza Texas Cases
In Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., an oil and gas lessee brought suit
to enjoin the operator of an adjoining property from performing a hy-
draulic fracturing operation that the plaintiff believed would result in
fractures crossing the property line.180 The plaintiff asserted that the
cross-border fracturing would constitute a subsurface trespass.181 The
case went to the Texas Supreme Court on the issue of whether the dis-
trict court had jurisdiction to hear the case, or whether the Texas Rail-
road Commission had primary jurisdiction.182 The Texas Supreme Court
decided the only issue that was before it, the jurisdiction question, by
holding that the district court had jurisdiction,183 but the court’s opinion
also contained dicta suggesting that a subsurface intrusion of fracturing
fluid would constitute a trespass.184 A companion case, Delhi-Taylor Oil
Corporation v. Holmes, presented the same jurisdictional issue and was
decided in a short opinion that cited Gregg.185
space above the ground” and that the doctrine “can no longer be regarded as law, if it ever
was”); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Dunlop, 266 N.Y.S. 469, 471 (Co. Ct. 1933) (“[I]t may
be confidently stated that, if [the ad coelum] doctrine ever meant that the owner of land
owned the space above the land to an indefinite height, it is no longer the law.”).
180. Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. 1961).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 412, 419.
184. Id. at 416 (“The pleadings allege a physical entrance into Delhi-Taylor’s leasehold.
While the drilling bit of Gregg’s well is not alleged to have extended into Delhi-Taylor’s
land, the same result is reached if in fact the cracks or veins extend into its land and gas is
produced therefrom by Gregg. To constitute a trespass, ‘entry upon another’s land need
not be in person, but may be made by causing or permitting a thing to cross the boundary
of the premises.’”).
185. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Holmes 344 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex. 1961).
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In Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., the owner of a well
hired a service company to perform hydraulic fracturing.186 Due to
equipment problems, the fracture did not extend as far as designed, and
the owner of the well sued the service company for damages.187 The jury
returned a verdict awarding damages to the owner of the well.188 The
service company appealed, in part based on the trial court’s rejection of
its argument that the owner of the well could not recover damages for
the entire difference between the design fracture length and the actual
fracture length.189 The service company argued that recovery for the en-
tire distance was improper because the designed fracture length would
have extended into a neighboring property, thereby committing a tres-
pass and facilitating the recovery of natural gas that the operator of the
well had no right to produce.190
The appellate court rejected the service company’s argument, con-
cluding that the argument ran counter to the rule of capture.191 The court
therefore affirmed, with only a minor reformation of the judgment re-
garding an error in the interest calculation.192 The service company
sought rehearing. The court denied rehearing, but with an interesting
split. The author of the original opinion changed his mind and dissented
from the appellate court’s denial of the service company’s motion for a
rehearing, apparently concluding that a subsurface intrusion of fractur-
ing fluid could constitute a trespass after all.193 One of the judges that
concurred in the denial of rehearing issued a short opinion, stating that
an alleged wrongdoer (the service company) should not be allowed to
raise as a defense to its wrongdoing the fact that the plaintiff might not
have title to the gas it was seeking to recover.194
The Texas Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion that
declared, “Fracing under the surface of another’s land constitutes a sub-
surface trespass.”195 But the Texas Supreme Court later withdrew its ini-
tial per curiam decision six months later, issuing a new per curiam
186. Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co. 817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991),
rev’d, 1992 WL 80263 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam), withdrawing per curiam decision and denying
writ of error, 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
187. Id. at 359.
188. Id. at 359–60.
189. Id. at 363–64.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 364.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 364–65 (Grant, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing).
194. Id. at 364 (Cornelius, J., concurring in denial of rehearing).
195. Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., No. D-1678, 1992 WL 80263, at *2 (Apr.
22, 1992) opinion withdrawn and superseded on overruling of reh’g, 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992).
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decision.196 The new decision superseded the prior per curiam decision
and denied the service company’s request for review.197 Further, in an
apparent effort to make sure that neither the initial per curiam decision
nor the new decision was given any value as precedent, the new decision
stated, “[i]n denying petitioner’s application for writ of error, we should
not be understood as approving or disapproving the opinions of the
court of appeals analyzing the rule of capture or trespass as they apply to
hydraulic fracturing.”198 This left in place the appellate court opinion.
Finally, there is Gifford Operating v. Indrex, Inc., a diversity jurisdic-
tion case decided between the first and second per curiam decisions by
the Texas Supreme Court in Geo Viking.199 In that decision, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas relied on the origi-
nal per curiam decision to hold that a subsurface intrusion of fracturing
fluid constituted a trespass.200
B. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust
In Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the defendant had hydraulically fractured wells drilled on
land adjacent to the land where the plaintiffs owned a royalty interest
(“plaintiffs’ land”), and that the fractures created by the defendant’s op-
erations had intruded into the subsurface of the plaintiffs’ land.201 The
plaintiffs sought damages, alleging that the fractures had facilitated the
drainage of hydrocarbons from beneath their land, and that such drain-
age had cost them royalty revenue that would have been due to them if
the hydrocarbons had been produced by a well located on their land, as
opposed to being produced by the defendant’s well on the adjoining
property.202 The plaintiffs did not allege any damages other than the loss
of royalty revenue.203
The majority stated that the court need not decide whether the
cross-border fracturing was a trespass because it was clear that there was
no “actionable trespass.”204 The court explained that the plaintiffs could
not recover in trespass without injury, and that the rule of capture barred
any recovery for drainage, which was the only injury alleged by the
196. Geo Viking, Inc., 839 S.W.2d at 797.
197. Id. at 798
198. Id.
199. Gifford Operating Co. v. Indrex, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22505 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
7, 1992).
200. Id. at 15.
201. Coastal Oil and Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2008).
202. Id. at 8.
203. Id. at 12–13.
204. Id.
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plaintiffs.205 The court described the rule of capture as applying when-
ever a person produces oil or gas “from a lawful well bottomed on . . .
property” where the person has a right to operate.206
The court justified what its characterized as its adherence to the
rule of capture on several grounds. First, Garza stated that a landowner
has adequate remedies even without having a trespass claim—namely,
the same remedies that a landowner has when he complains about drain-
age that is caused by a neighboring well that is not hydraulically frac-
tured. For example, he can drill an offset well.207 Or, if his land is under
lease, he can demand that his lessee drill an offset well and, if the lessee
fails to do so, he can bring suit against his lessee for a breach of the
implied covenant to protect against drainage.208 Or, he can seek forced
pooling.209
Second, the court stated that the preferable way to govern the pro-
duction of oil and gas is for the Texas Railroad Commission to use its
regulatory authority to balance the rule of capture with appropriate mea-
sures to prevent waste and protect correlative rights.210 Third, it ex-
plained that courts are not well-equipped to determine the amount of
drainage, or to take into account social policies in resolving whether a
plaintiff has or does not have a viable claim based on subsurface intru-
sions resulting from hydraulic fracturing.211
Finally, the court stated that it had received amicus briefs from
groups representing a variety of interests, including “regulators, land-
owners, royalty owners, operators, and hydraulic fracturing service
providers,” and that they had all opposed imposing liability for hydrau-
lic fracturing that crosses subsurface property lines.212 Accordingly, the
court concluded that “the law of capture should not be changed to apply
differently to hydraulic fracturing.”213
The result of the decision—that there is no liability for fractures
that cross property lines—is defensible, but the court’s reasoning seems
flawed. The majority concluded that its rule of capture analysis was suf-
ficient to decide the case and that the court need not determine whether
the cross-border fracturing constituted a trespass. But such a conclusion
ignores the fact that the rule of capture does not necessarily apply if the
205. Id.
206. Id. at 13.
207. Id. at 14.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 14–15.
211. Id. at 16.
212. Id. at 16–17.
213. Id. at 16.
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capture of oil or gas is made possible by a trespass or other illegal activ-
ity. Indeed, Garza itself recognized that the intrusion of a slant well
would be a trespass214 and that the rule of capture does not necessarily
apply if an operator facilitates its production of oil by illegal means.215
Thus, the court could not properly ignore the question of whether the
defendant had committed a trespass, and, if so, how it affected the defen-
dant’s potential liability.216
To be fair, the majority opinion was not wholly lacking in trespass
analysis. The majority quoted Causby’s statement that a literal applica-
tion of the ad coelum doctrine “has no place in the modern world.”217 The
court added, “[t]he law of trespass need no more be the same two miles
below the surface than two miles above.”218 The court’s rejection of a
literal application of the ad coelum doctrine cannot reasonably be assailed,
but such a rejection is not the same as analyzing whether a subsurface
intrusion of fracturing fluid constitutes a trespass. In a separate section
of the opinion, the majority devoted one paragraph to rejecting the plain-
tiffs’ claim that cross-border fracturing is the equivalent of drilling a
slant well that crosses the property line.219 The majority stated that the
slant drilling situation is distinguishable from fracturing because the
capture of oil or gas by a slant well actually occurs under the plaintiff’s
property, whereas in both a traditional rule of capture case and a fractur-
ing trespass case, the oil or gas drains away and the actual capture takes
place on the operator’s property.220 Thus, one can use an offset well to
combat drainage in the traditional rule of capture case or the fracturing
trespass case, whereas an offset well cannot protect against a trespassing
slant well.221
214. Id. at 13 n.4 (acknowledging the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Hastings Oil
Co. v. Tex. Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (1950) that an operator commits a trespass when it drills a
well that bottoms on the neighbor’s property. Hastings did not expressly address the appli-
cability of the rule of capture when a slant well trespasses, but it did not need to address
the issue because the court in that case affirmed a lower court ruling that enjoined the
operator from testing or producing oil from the trespassing well).
215. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 13 n. 39 (citing Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co., 37 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1931), aff’d, 98 S.W.2d 781 (1936), a prior case in which the Texas Supreme Court
affirmed a lower court ruling that the rule of capture did not protect an operator who had
violated the law by illegally using a vacuum pump to facilitate production).
216. Other commentators also have noted this flaw in the majority’s reasoning. See, e.g.,
Pierce, supra note 40 at 770–72 (Professor Pierce refers to this as an “obvious flaw” in the R
court’s reasoning).
217. Garza, 268 S.W. 3d at 11.
218. Id.
219. Id. 13–14.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 14.
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In addition to the majority opinion, there was a concurring opin-
ion and a dissenting opinion. The concurring opinion stated that the
court should have ruled that the cross-border fracturing was not a tres-
pass.222 The concurring justice asserted that public policy strongly favors
the use of hydraulic fracturing for purposes of maximizing the produc-
tion of oil and natural gas and that the court should bar fracturing-based
trespass claims in order to avoid the chilling effect such litigation would
have on industry’s use of the process.223 The concurring opinion stated
that landowners or royalty owners who feel aggrieved by cross-border
fracturing have a self-help remedy (namely, to drill their own wells), that
the “orthodox rules” relating to surface trespass were not appropriate for
“absolutist” application with respect to subsurface intrusions, and that
the regulation of fracturing should be left to the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion, the state agency that regulates oil and gas matters.224
The dissenting opinion stated that the court should have reached
the issue of whether the cross-border fracturing constituted a trespass.225
The dissenting justices did not say how they would have decided that
issue, but the tone of their opinion suggests that they would have de-
cided the subsurface intrusion of fracturing fluid was a trespass and that
such trespass precluded application of the rule of capture.226
C. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC
In Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, the plaintiffs asserted claims
for trespass.227 They alleged that the defendant had drilled a well that
contained a vertical section about 200 feet from the plaintiffs’ property
but that the well’s horizontal lateral approached to within “tens of feet”
of their property, and that the hydraulic fracturing fluid intruded into
the subsurface of their property.228
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the trespass
claim.229 They argued that the claim was barred by the rule of capture,230
222. Id. at 35–36 (Willett, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 26–42 (Willett, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 35–36, 38–39 (Willett, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 47 (Johnson, J., dissenting, joined by two additional justices).
226. Id. at 42–47 (Johnson, J., dissenting, joined by two additional justices).
227. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2013 WL 2097397 *1 (N.D. W. Va.). The
plaintiffs also asserted a claim for a breach of the implied covenant to protect against drain-
age (the defendant was the plaintiffs’ lessee) and a breach of contract, with the alleged
breach being that the defendant had pooled the plaintiffs’ property with other properties
for purposes of production from the Marcellus Shale, but that the plaintiffs’ lease did not
authorize such pooling.
228. Id. at *2.
229. Id. at *1.
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relying in part on the reasoning of Garza,231 but the Stone court rejected
that argument. Garza had supported its conclusion with a traditional jus-
tification for the rule of capture—the fact that certain self-help remedies
still are available for landowners concerned about drainage even when
the rule of capture applies. The Stone court acknowledged that the West
Virginia Supreme Court had adopted the rule of capture, but still re-
jected the availability of self-help as a reason to reject a claim for subsur-
face trespass. The court explained that self-help remedies are inadequate
because some landowners lack the resources to utilize them.232
The Stone court similarly rejected the other reasons that Garza
gave in support of its conclusion that “the rule of capture should not be
changed.” The court also relied on the reasoning in Young v. Ethyl Corp.,
in which the United States Eighth Circuit concluded that the rule of cap-
ture should not apply in the context of a brine production process that
works much like waterflooding, with water being injected into the sub-
surface using multiple injection wells in order to push the flow of brine
toward a production well.233
After concluding that the rule of capture should not apply, and
therefore was not a viable defense to the plaintiffs’ trespass claim, the
court turned to the issue of whether there had been a trespass. The court
concluded that there had been a trespass, relying on the fact that the
West Virginia Supreme Court previously had stated the ad coelum doc-
trine governed a landowner’s ownership rights.234 Accordingly, the court
rejected the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.235
The result in Stone, like that in Garza, is defensible, but the reason-
ing in Stone, like that in Garza, is less than satisfactory with respect to the
question of whether the defendants’ actions constituted a trespass.236
Stone discussed the issue, but its analysis was hardly more thorough
than that in Garza, which disclaimed any need to decide whether there
had been a trespass. Stone began its discussion of the trespass question
by expressly noting Garza’s quote from Causby that the ad coelum doctrine
230. Id. at *2.
231. Id. at *4.
232. Id. at *6.
233. Id. at *6 (quoting Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975)).
234. Id. at *7–8.
235. Id. at *9.
236. The imperfections in the reasoning of Stone are ironic given that the case projects
not merely a rejection of the reasoning in Garza, 268 S.W. 3d 1, but complete disdain for it.
See, e.g., Stone 2013 WL 2097397 at *6 (“The Garza opinion gives oil and gas operators a
blank check to steal from the small landowner.”); id. (“[T]his Court simply cannot believe
that our West Virginia Supreme Court would permit such a result.”).
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“has no place in the modern world,”237 a quote by which Garza and
Causby expressed their conclusion that the doctrine does not apply liter-
ally. Stone then contrasted that quote with a quote in which the West
Virginia Supreme Court “reaffirmed the maxim” in 2003.238 But it strains
plausibility for Stone to suggest that the ad coelum doctrine applies liter-
ally under West Virginia law.
Neither the West Virginia Supreme Court nor any other court has
ever applied the doctrine to its full, literal extent, and the commentators
and courts that have examined the issue have uniformly concluded that
the doctrine is mere dicta that does not apply literally.239 Further, the
West Virginia Supreme Court case that Stone quotes was not dealing
with hydraulic fracturing or a claim for trespass, or with any other issue
that sheds much light on whether subsurface intrusions by fracturing
fluid constitute a trespass. Instead, the quoted case merely addressed
whether the language of a particular oil and gas lease granted the right
to produce coalbed methane.240
V. PROPOSED “TRADITIONAL” TRESPASS MODEL
To properly resolve whether the intrusion of fracturing fluid con-
stitutes an actionable subsurface trespass, a court must examine the na-
ture of a plaintiff’s interest in the subsurface. Neither Garza nor Stone
gave proper attention to this issue. In Garza, the court failed to give this
issue appropriate attention because the court concluded that it could re-
solve the plaintiffs’ claims by a rule of capture analysis alone. The court
should have more thoroughly considered whether the defendant’s frac-
turing across property lines constituted a trespass that precluded appli-
cation of the rule of capture. In Stone, the court oversimplified the
dispute it faced by casually dismissing the possibility that the ad coelum
doctrine might not apply at the depths at which the defendants were
operating, and that the defendants’ actions therefore might not consti-
tute a trespass. Thus, neither court properly analyzed whether a trespass
had occurred.
So what is the proper model or test for analyzing whether a tres-
pass has occurred? If the ad coelum doctrine were given literal applica-
237. Id. at *7.
238. Id. at *7 (quoting Drummond v. White Oak Fuel, 104 W.Va. 368, 140 S.E. 57 (1927);
Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 143 n.14 (2003)).
239. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817, 825 (Ga. 1934); Swetland v. Curtiss Air-
ports Corp., 41 F.2d 929, 936–38 (N.D. Ohio 1930); John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of
the Earth, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 979, 999–1003 (2008).
240. Drummond v. White Oak Fuel, 104 W.Va. 368, 140 S.E. 57 (1927); Energy Develop-
ment Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 143 (2003).
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tion, any subsurface or airspace intrusion could be the basis for a
trespass claim. But no one can plausibly deny that the full, literal state-
ment of the ad coelum doctrine is mere dicta and that it always has been
mere dicta. Further, there is a clear trend of courts limiting the ability of
plaintiffs to recover in trespass for intrusions at high elevation and great
depths. Therefore, a model which provides that any subsurface or air-
space intrusion constitutes a trespass is not a true expression of the tradi-
tional trespass model. Instead, such a model is no more than a purported
traditional model.
A true traditional model must be gleaned from the actual hold-
ings of cases, not dicta. Based on the traditional concept that trespass is a
claim to vindicate a plaintiff’s right to exclusive possession of property,
and the case law dealing with subsurface and airspace trespass, the most
accurate description of trespass law for airspace and subsurface intru-
sions is that a landowner does not have a claim for airspace or subsur-
face trespass unless an intrusion occurs: (1) relatively near the surface or
(2) at an elevation or depth where a landowner could reasonably be ex-
pected to exercise exclusive use of the area in some manner that would
not involve the landowner himself likely causing intrusions into another
person’s airspace or subsurface. In some circumstances, if important
public policy concerns provide reasons to limit trespass clams, it will be
appropriate to add the additional restriction that a plaintiff cannot re-
cover unless the defendant’s conduct unreasonably interferes with the
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his land, as the Restatement (Second) of
Torts has done for airspace trespasses.
Support for the accuracy of this description of the true traditional
model of airspace and subsurface trespass law comes from the fact that
the expression of this model (the “Model”) is consistent with the results
in most case law involving claims of airspace and subsurface intrusions.
For example, the Model would allow liability for low-level intrusions
across a plaintiff’s land by building protrusions, as well as intrusions by
low altitude flights that interfere with his use and enjoyment of his land.
But the Model would not impose trespass liability for high altitude
flights because a landowner could not reasonably be expected to use
such elevations in connection with his use and enjoyment of his land. His
only practical use of such elevations would be for his own air travel,
which would not be related to his use and enjoyment of his land, and
which (as a practical matter) likely would involve him flying over the
airspace of other person’s property. Such results are consistent with most
existing airspace trespass jurisprudence.
This Model is also consistent with the rule that there is no liability
for injection disposal operations that result in waste fluids crossing prop-
erty lines. Such injections typically are made into deep formations that
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do not contain water that is drinking water quality or does not contain
commercial quantities of hydrocarbons. In most cases, a landowner’s
only use of such a formation below his land would be if he wished to
conduct his own injection disposal. But if he does that, the waste fluids
that he would discard in the formation eventually would migrate be-
yond his property if he operated the injection well for any considerable
period of time. Thus, the Model provides for the same result as the ex-
isting jurisprudence.
VI. APPLYING THE PROPOSED “TRADITIONAL” MODEL TO
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING INTRUSIONS
A. Application to “Near Border” Intrusions
This article’s “Model” would preclude trespass liability for sub-
surface intrusions of hydraulic fracturing fluids, provided that the opera-
tor did not design the fracture to go beyond the border, and the operator
did not negligently cause the fractures to extend beyond the border for a
significantly greater distance than the fractures otherwise would have in
the absence of negligence. The reasoning for this result is as follows.
Assume that there is a subsurface formation from which oil or gas
can be produced using hydraulic fracturing, but that there is no other
practical use of the formation. The length of hydraulic fractures cannot
be controlled with precision, though fracture length can be estimated.
For purposes of discussion, suppose that the existing state of technology
is such that, when companies conduct hydraulic fracturing in the forma-
tion, they typically can control fracture lengths within a distance of plus
or minus 500 feet (for convenience, this article will sometimes refer to the
typical maximum distance between predicated fracture lengths and ac-
tual fracture lengths as the “Length of Typical Fracture Uncertainty”).241
If an operator (“Operator”) wanted to ensure that it did not unintention-
ally cause fracturing fluid to enter the subsurface of land belonging to
the neighbor (the “Neighbor”), the Operator would have to design its
projected fracture length to stop 500 feet short of the property line. As-
sume now that the Neighbor also wants to engage in hydraulic fractur-
241. Of course this is a simplification. Logically, the “plus or minus” distance within
which fracture length can be controlled should depend on the degree of certainty or confi-
dence that the “error” will not be exceeded. Thus, the “plus or minus” deviation would be
greater if a company wanted to be 95 percent certain it would not exceed a particular
length than if it were satisfied with being 90 percent certain that it would not exceed a
particular length. Further, even for a given percentage confidence level, it might be difficult
to define the “plus or minus” distance, and it likely would be different in different
formations.
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ing.242 If the Neighbor wanted to ensure that he did not cause a
subsurface intrusion of fracturing fluid, then he would have to design his
own fractures to stop 500 feet from the property line.
Thus, neither the Operator nor the Neighbor can intentionally use
the area within 500 feet of the property line, unless they accept the possi-
bility that they might unintentionally cause fractures to cross the prop-
erty line. But if they design their fractures to extend all the way to the
property line, accepting the possibility of unintentional subsurface intru-
sions, they are each accepting the possibility that they will not have ex-
clusive actual use of the 500 feet of their subsurface that is nearest the
property line.
Under the Model, a person would not have a claim for subsurface
trespass unless there were an intrusion into an area where he could exer-
cise exclusive use without risking that he will intrude into another per-
son’s subsurface. As applied to the Operator and Neighbor, neither of
them should have a trespass claim for subsurface intrusions of fracturing
fluid that extend less than 500 feet onto their side of the property line
(the “Near Border” area), because neither of them can expect to exercise
exclusive use of that area without risking the possibility that they will
cause subsurface intrusions onto the other’s property.
Notably, this means that the Operator and Neighbor can each de-
sign their own fractures to extend to the property line and still be confi-
dent that they will not incur trespass liability because they typically can
control their fracture lengths to within plus or minus 500 feet, which is
the depth of the Near Border area within which they will not incur liabil-
ity for subsurface intrusions. But if they designed their fractures to ex-
tend across into the other’s subsurface, they would risk trespass liability.
Both the ability to design their fractures to extend to the border and the
fact that they will risk liability if they design their fractures to go further
have an aspect of fairness.
Contrast this with a system that would impose trespass liability
even for slight Near Border intrusions. The message such a liability
scheme would send is that the Operator and Neighbor should each seek
to avoid even small subsurface intrusions. They could do that, but only
by designing their fractures to stop 500 feet short of the property line.
Thus, any gain that either the Neighbor or Operator obtained by being
less at risk for drainage from the other’s fracturing operations would be
a purely illusory gain because it would come at a cost of their designing
242. If, on the other hand, we assume that the Neighbor would never fracture, then the
Neighbor would never produce oil or gas from the Formation and thus would not be
harmed by drainage because he never would have produced oil or gas from the Formation
anyway.
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their own fractures to be shorter, and thus to drain less area. Further, if
they each designed their fractures to stop 500 feet from the property line,
that would result in waste243 because it would mean that between the
two of them, Neighbor and Operator would leave a 1,000-foot-wide
buffer zone (500 feet on each side of the border) that would be left un-
fractured (unless fractures inadvertently extend beyond the design dis-
tance). Thus, there would be waste, without any gain in the protection of
correlative rights.
For these reasons, traditional conservation goals of avoiding
waste and protecting correlative rights are better served by the Model
than by a scheme that imposes trespass liability for any subsurface intru-
sion. But conservation regulations could take additional steps to protect
correlative rights. For example, conservation agencies should consider
regulations that would actually prohibit an operator from designing its
fracturing plan to intentionally extend fractures beyond a property line,
into the subsurface of land where the company has no right to operate.
Setback rules can be used to prohibit an operator from drilling a horizon-
tal lateral too close to the property line. And if credible evidence shows
that an operator’s fractures have crossed property lines into the Near
Border subsurface of the neighboring property, conservation agencies
that have statutory pooling authority should stand ready to use that au-
thority to create a pooled area, or revise an existing pooled area, to en-
sure that the owner of the neighboring property gets some share of the
oil or gas produced by a well that is draining the Near Border area.
B. Application to “Interior Property” Intrusions
The prior section of this article discussed application of the Model
to the Near Border area. “Near Border” was defined by reference to the
“Length of Typical Fracture Uncertainty,” which was defined as the typi-
cal maximum difference between actual fracture lengths and the fracture
lengths that were predicted prior to the fracturing operation being per-
formed. The Near Border area was defined as the area within the Length
of Typical Fracture Uncertainty from the border. Thus, if the Length of
Typical Fracture Uncertainty was 500 feet, the Near Border area would
be the area within 500 feet of either side of the border. The area further
than 500 feet from the border could be called the Interior Property area
(“Interior Property”).
Hydraulic fractures that intrude into the Interior Property areas of
a neighboring property raise different issues than those that intrude only
243. Avoidance of waste is a traditional goal of virtually all conservation regulations.
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5.
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into the Near Border area. First, for example, assuming that the operator
usually can control the fracture lengths within the Length of Typical
Fracture Uncertainty, the intrusion of fractures into the Interior Property
of the neighbor probably means that the operator probably designed its
fractures to go beyond the border. That raises fairness issues that are not
present when an operator designs his fractures to go no further than the
border, but the fractures inadvertently intrude into the Near Border re-
gion of the neighbor’s subsurface.
Second, if the law allows an operator to routinely fracture into the
neighbor’s Interior Property, that gives the neighbor the incentive to “go
and do likewise,” that is, to fracture into the Interior Property of the land
owned or leased by the operator. That creates the potential for economic
waste in the form of excessive drilling and fracturing, just as the rule of
capture creates an incentive for excessive drilling when the rule is not
tempered by such conservation measures as well spacing regulations
and statutory pooling.
Third, the neighbor has a stronger property interest in the subsur-
face of his Interior Property. As noted above, because a person cannot
control the length of his hydraulic fractures with precision, he cannot
design his fractures to reach into the Near Border subsurface of his own
property unless he is willing to take the chance that his own fractures
will cross the border. Thus, a person cannot expect to exercise exclusive
use and possession of his own Near Border subsurface, whether or not
Near Border intrusions are treated as trespasses. If the law treats Near
Border intrusions as trespasses and imposes liability for such intrusions,
a person must leave his own Near Border area unfractured in order to
avoid the risk that he inadvertently will cause subsurface intrusions into
his neighbor’s Near Border subsurface because of his inability to pre-
cisely control the length of the fractures he creates. On the other hand, if
the law does not impose liability for Near Border intrusions, a person
can fracture his Near Border subsurface, but he cannot count on having
exclusive use and possession of that area because his neighbor will be
free to fracture into that area without liability.
In contrast, a person can fracture his Interior Property subsurface
without risk of causing fractures to intrude beyond the border, and the
same can be said for his neighbor. Thus, a person can exercise exclusive
use by fracturing the subsurface of the Interior Property regions of his
land. Accordingly, a person has a much stronger property interest in the
Interior Property subsurface than in the Near Border subsurface, and a
much stronger interest in whether he can bring a trespass claim if some-
one causes intrusions into that area.
Moreover, given that a person can exercise exclusive use of the
Interior Property subsurface without risk that he will intrude into an-
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other person’s subsurface, the Model for evaluating trespass claims sug-
gests that, under a traditional trespass model, a landowner should be
allowed to bring a trespass claim if someone intrudes into that area (un-
less public policy concerns dictate that a person cannot prevail in tres-
pass without also showing actual harm or an actual interference with his
use and enjoyment of his property). Such a legal regime would honor
traditional conceptions of property rights and trespass, and also would
provide some protection for correlative rights.
VII. MODERN MODELS
Arguments can be made for various other potential models for
determining trespass liability that would diverge even further from a
model based on the literal language of the ad coelum doctrine than does
the Model described above. For example, the discussion above simplifies
the analysis by assuming that there is a specific “plus or minus” distance
within which companies can control the length of fractures. Because the
potential for fracture length to vary from the designed fracture length is
more complex than saying that operators can control the length within a
single “plus or minus” distance, and because the use of hydraulic fractur-
ing serves public policy, one could argue for some other trespass rule
that gives fracturing operations greater protection against trespass
claims.
Indeed, Professor Owen Anderson has made a forceful argument
that there generally should not be liability for fracturing intrusions.244
Based on many of the same lines of cases discussed above, as well as
public policy arguments, he argues that the current state of the law
should be recognized as prohibiting subsurface trespass claims unless
the plaintiff demonstrates that the subsurface intrusion reached subsur-
face areas relatively near the surface and the intrusion interfered with
the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his land. Professor Anderson argues
that such a rule would be a mirror image of the Restatement’s rule for
trespass claims based on aircraft flights over property and that such a
rule would serve public policy. His proposal generally would bar sub-
surface trespass claims based on fractures even if they intrude far be-
yond a border. A potential benefit of Professor Anderson’s proposal is
that it would eliminate litigation over what is the dimension of the Near
Borer area. But in order to avoid waste and infringements on correlative
244. Anderson, supra note 3, at 203. Professor Anderson argues that the Restatement R
(Second) of Torts should be revised to give subsurface intrusions a status similar to air-
space intrusions by aircraft, so that there is no liability for subsurface trespass unless the
intrusion is near the surface of the land and “it interferes substantially with the other’s use
and enjoyment of his land.” Id. at 211.
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rights of the type noted in Part VI(B) of this article, a conservation
agency would have to take an active role in managing forced pooling,
spacing, and fracturing plans if such a model were used.
Professor David Pierce has argued that the fact that fractures cross
property lines should not necessarily be a basis for trespass liability, and
that an operator’s potential liability should be evaluated based on a cor-
relative rights analysis.245 Such a regime would allow for significant flexi-
bility in promoting production, while simultaneously preventing waste
and protecting correlative rights, but the effective administration of such
a regime also would require conservation agencies to be very active in
order to promote their twin mission of preventing waste and protecting
correlative rights.
CONCLUSION
There is growing interest in the question of whether a person who
is conducting hydraulic fracturing commits an actionable subsurface
trespass when he causes fractures to cross into the subsurface of a neigh-
bor’s land and those fractures facilitate drainage of hydrocarbons, but
otherwise causes no harm to the neighbor. Two courts have addressed
this question in recent years, but they reached opposite conclusions and
neither provided satisfactory analysis of the trespass question.
The traditional expression of the ad coelum doctrine would suggest
that a landowner’s ownership includes the entire subsurface of his prop-
erty, all the way to the center of the earth, as well as to all the airspace
above his property, all the way into space. But the traditional expression
of that doctrine is mere dicta. Case law recognizes the validity of trespass
claims for airspace and subsurface intrusions that occur relatively near
the surface, but a clear majority of courts that have faced disputes over
high elevation intrusions or deep subsurface intrusions have held that a
plaintiff cannot recover in trespass for such intrusions absent interfer-
ence with his use and enjoyment of his property. This majority result,
245. Pierce, supra note 40 at 771–72. Professor Pierce writes that, “[i]t is not a simple R
trespass issue because each owner overlying the reservoir in fact has rights in the reservoir
beneath every other owners’ land.” He states:
[A]ddressing the issue in a correlative rights context requires that the con-
duct itself be evaluated to determine whether it is appropriate behavior
within the reservoir community. Under a correlative rights analysis, if the
hydraulic fracturing is held to be “appropriate behavior within the reser-
voir community,” the resulting drainage will be protected by the rule of
capture. On the other hand, if the hydraulic fracturing is held to violate
correlative rights of others within the reservoir community, drainage will
not be protected by the rule of capture.
Id. at 771 (footnotes omitted).
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rather than a literal expression of the ad coelum doctrine, is the true ex-
pression of the law regarding airspace and subsurface trespass claims.
This article has proposed a test for determining whether a subsur-
face intrusion by hydraulic fracturing constitutes a trespass. This
“Model” approach combines the established law regarding airspace and
subsurface trespass with the traditional concept that claims for trespass
are designed to vindicate a plaintiff’s interest in the exclusive possession
of property. When this Model is applied to trespass claims that are based
on intrusions by hydraulic fractures, it is evident that there should not be
liability for such intrusions if they do not extend beyond the property
border for a distance greater than the typical “plus or minus” distance
within which fracture length can be controlled. This is because a land-
owner and his neighbor cannot use such “Near Border” areas of their
respective properties for purposes of hydraulic fracturing (the only prac-
tical use that can be made of some formations) without risking that they
will cause subsurface intrusions into the other’s property. Thus, they
cannot have both the actual use and the exclusive possession of the Near
Border subsurface of their respective land—they can have only one or
another. Under such circumstances, application of the Model demon-
strates that neither of them should have trespass claims for Near Border
subsurface intrusions by the other.
In contrast, when fractures intrude beyond the Near Border area,
a trespass claim should be allowed. A landowner has a greater interest in
protecting the interior areas of his property from subsurface intrusions
than the Near Border areas. Further, if there were no liability in trespass
for subsurface intrusions beyond the Near Border area, that might
prompt neighbors to hydraulically fracture as far as possible into the
each other’s property, thereby resulting in economic waste in the form of
excess fracturing.
Finally, it should be noted that certain public policy arguments
favor a “modern” model that would place greater restrictions on subsur-
face trespass claims, but conservation agencies would need to vigilantly
apply conservation regulations in order to prevent waste and protect
correlative rights if significantly greater limitations were placed on sub-
surface trespass claims.
